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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Initially social networking was introduced to the masses as a means of connecting individuals with similar interests, which seemed like an excellent idea. For example, Facebook
was created originally as an online directory for Harvard University students. Needless to
say, social networking has exploded into a phenomenon that the world has liberally accepted [28]. So much so, that social networking has incorporated itself into American
politics. Social networking has also become a major part of day-to-day operations for
individuals as well as for businesses and corporations. However, the acceptance of social
networking has also added to the controversies surrounding computer/information security.
More specifcally, the acceptance of social networking has increased the diffculty to suffciently protect data, assets, trade secrets, and more from malicious entities. The issues
related to computer and/or information security have become so extreme that it has forever
altered the way developers design and implement software and/or systems. This chapter
is divided into three sections to further explore and explain the changes brought on by
social networking. Section 1.1 opens with statistics on different social networking sites
to demonstrate just how popular social networking has become. Also, social engineering
and phishing are defned in Section 1.1. In Section 1.2, some statistics and controversial

1

issues are discussed to highlight the severity of social engineering and phishing, which
serves as motivation for this work. Finally, Section 1.3 is where the research questions and
hypotheses are defned.

1.1

Social Networking Births Social Engineering and Phishing
To give an idea of just how serious this social networking phenomenon has become, a

few statistics related to social networking sites are presented. Foursquare, founded in 2009,
is a mobile application that allows people to track every place an individual visits and to
locate ideal places to visit as well. Since its inception, Foursquare has grown to 50 million
users and has reached over 12 billion check-ins [15] [16]. Facebook, on the other hand,
was created in 2004, and as of September 2017 (third quarter) it had a grand total of 1.37
billion daily users. Additionally, third quarter member statistics from September 30, 2017
revealed Facebook had 2.07 billion monthly active users (those users that have logged on
within the last 30 days) [13] [56]. Instagram, a social networking site that allows its users
to edit and share pictures and videos, had more than 800 million members as of September
2017 [2]. With respect to the social media sites that made news headlines, Twitter is a
“microblogging service” that allows users to read along with and post brief messages (only
140 characters) called tweets, which may include images and short videos. Founded in
2006, Twitter had 328 million users as of September 2017 [57]. These are just a few of the
common social networking sites/applications. See Figure 1.1 below for a list of the most
widely known social networking sites worldwide ranked by the number of active users (in
millions) as of September 2017 [57]. Figure 1.1 illustrates the wide acceptance of social
2

networking by highlighting the number of social networking applications and listing the
vast number of people that use these applications.

Figure 1.1: Most Popular Social Networking Applications

As with all things new, there are individuals who use social networking for its intended
purpose and those who have devised ways to use social networking for their own malicious
objectives. Social engineering and phishing are the malicious results of social networking.
Jarad Kee [29] defned social engineering as coaxing an individual to perform some action
or to disclose some information. According to Kee there are six tactics that can be used
to accomplish social engineering: telephone, online, dumpster diving, shoulder surfng,
reverse social engineering, and persuasion. Telephone was described as the use of either
3

a mobile or land line telephone to obtain information or get a person to perform some
action. Gathering or coaxing information via internet chat sessions, email, or any means
of communication that requires a network or the internet belongs to the online category.
Dumpster diving refers to searching for or obtaining information by sorting through rejected or thrown-out materials (a person’s trash). The process of obtaining information by
quietly peering over a person’s shoulder either at close range or long range was classifed as
shoulder surfng. In order to execute reverse social engineering, an attacker must succeed
in getting the victim to make initial contact with the attacking entity. This makes reverse
social engineering the most cunning of the six tactics because it increases the degree of
diffculty for the victim to establish the legitimacy of the interaction. Last, persuasion has
occurred when a person is deceived or coerced to willingly provide information [29].
The term phishing has been coined to designate specifc types of social engineering
attacks. A formal defnition states that phishing is a semantic attack which deploys fabricated emails, counterfeit websites, and spoofed phone calls to deceive its victims [4] [30]
[7] [32] [29] [9]. Phishing can be divided into fve taxonomies, which are as follows:
1. Impersonate: This is the most common of the fve, where the phishing email deceitfully alleges to be from a legitimate business that the victims knows. Phishers
achieve this by using emblems and artwork from the legitimate website. By design
this form of attack is diffcult for some users to differentiate between the phony email
and the legitimate email.
2. Forward Attack: This form of attack is complex because the attacker not only uses
a fake email, but the email contains malicious code or script. The malicious executable hidden within the email, which contains input felds, collects the victim’s
information before navigating the user to the offcial website.
3. Pop-up Attack: This is a cunning attack, because it makes use of legitimate websites
accompanied with a deceitful pop-up. It is the pop-up that obtains the victim’s information before transferring the victim to the offcial website. Another name for this
4

attack is “man-in-the-middle” because the pop-up window functions as the middle
man.
4. Voice Phishing Attack/Vishing: This new and improved attack uses both VOIP (Voice
Over Internet Protocol) along with traditional phishing methods. There are two primary ways this attack can be executed. First, the target receives an illegitimate email,
which instructs the victim to provide information via the phone rather than forwarding the victim to a phony website. After calling the number, the victim provides
his/her information by using a series of automated prompts. In the second form of
this attack, the prey is called from a fraudulent phone number. Once the victim has
answered the call, the target is instructed by an automated message that some form
of action is required related to his/her account.
5. Mobile Phishing Attack/Smishing: This form of attack became popular in 2006,
when attackers began deviating their attacks to include mobile devices. This attack
takes advantage of mobile phone providers’ SMS (Short Message Service) via text
messages. Attackers try to trick users into following fraudulent mobile internet links
[52].

Social engineering and phishing are the malicious results of social networking that
malicious attackers use to their advantage. Because of its unpropitious nature, it is only
beftting to investigate what motivates these types of attacks. Essentially, there were three
categories noted for which an attackers’ motives may belong. The frst category was fnancial gain; this is where attackers use stolen information for their fnancial gain. In this
category, the main target is banking information, but it is not limited to banking credentials. Identity hiding/fraud, the second category, was where attackers would steal a victim’s
identity. The phisher/attacker may not use the stolen identity per say, but the stolen identity
may be used/sold to another individual. For example, the attacker may sell it to a criminal to hide their identity. The last category was celebrity/notoriety, where the attacker is
seeking to make a name for him/herself among fellow attackers [30].

5

1.2

Motivation
With these tools, social engineering and phishing, malicious attackers have wreaked

havoc throughout cyberspace. This work was motivated by the growing number of internet
crimes, especially those associated with social engineering and phishing attacks coupled
with the devastating economic effects [4] [36] [22]. Social engineering is partly responsible
for several high profle cyber attacks, including attacks on RSA, JP Morgan, AT&T, and
the Ukrainian power grid. [36]. Due to the chaos caused by malicious attackers, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) created a subsector in 2000 called the Internet Crime
Complaint Center (IC3), where the public can report internet-facilitated crimes. In addition
to investigating reported crimes, the IC3 also conducts analyses for intelligence purposes
as well as for public awareness. The annual report published by IC3 has offered some
insightful statistics on the criminal activity conducted over the internet [22] [23].
According to the 2016 annual report, since IC3’s inception in May 2000, there have
been 3,762,348 complaints reported. Monetary losses from internet crimes from 2012
through 2016 totaled to $4.63 billion. The losses from 2016 alone were $1.33 billion, with
the total number of complaints being 298,728. Given these numbers, one explanation may
be that crimes are only reported when large sums of money are involved. On average, the
IC3 receives about 280,000 complaints a year, but on a daily basis IC3 receives about 800
complaints. The United States is leading the pack with the most internet crimes reported,
followed by Canada, India, United Kingdom, Australia, and then France. See Figure 1.2
below for a list of the top 20 foreign countries ranked by victims of internet crimes reported
in 2016 [22] [23]. The remainder of this section highlights the effects/damages internet
6

crimes and phishing/social engineering have caused within the United States, as a means
to illustrate the need for developing better defense tactics.

Figure 1.2: Top 20 Foreign Countries Ranked by Crime - numbers in thousands

Social engineering and phishing are responsible for substantial damage around the
globe, but phishing and social engineering and/or internet crimes are also responsible for
causing extensive damage in the United States. As mentioned earlier, the United States
leads the pack for reported internet crimes; however, the top ten states have some astonishing numbers, when compared to other countries. The top ten states are California, Texas,
New York, Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, Ohio, and Washington. Not
only do these ten states have the most victims, but they also have the greatest fnancial
losses, except for two states trading places for the top ten list of fnancial losses. Table 1.2
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is a depiction of the top ten states ranked by the number of victims and Figure 1.3 is an
illustration of the top ten states by fscal loss [22] [23].
In the United States, it appears that individuals in the age range of 60 and older had the
most victims and the greatest fnancial losses. This could either mean they are the most
targeted or they are the easiest to deceive. The age range 30-39 ranked second for most
victims, but not for fnancial losses; that goes to the age group 50-59. The full break-down
of age groups ranked by economic losses can be seen in Table 1.1 [22] [23]. Needless to
say, social engineering and phishing have not just been tools to wreak havoc on individuals,
but they have had an impact also on business, corporate, and social aspects of society.

Table 1.1: Victims by Age Group
Age Range: Number of Victims: Fiscal Loss:
Over 60

55,043

339,474,918

50-59

49,208

298,145,628

40-49

51,394

224,322,960

30-39

54,670

190,095,752

20-29

46,266

68,015,095

Under 20

10,004

6,698,742
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Table 1.2: Top 10 States Ranked by Number of Victims
Top 10 States
State:

Number of Victims

California

395,474

Texas

21,441

Florida

21,068

New York

16,426

Illinois

9,177

Maryland

8,361

Pennsylvania

8,265

Virginia

8,068

Ohio

7,052

Washington

6,874

Ranked by Number of Victims
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Figure 1.3: Top 10 States Ranked by Fiscal Loss
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Phishing and social engineering attacks have made their way into politics and warfare.
Recently, cyber espionage has become a major issue. Due to the United States being more
technologically advanced than many countries, the United States is extremely vulnerable
to cyber assaults. The previous statement is validated by the fact that government computers are hacked daily. Thus, it is crucial that efforts to improve information security be
continuous to become and remain optimal; that entails having the best methods in place
to defend against phishing and social engineering from a hardware, software, and user
standard operating procedure [36] [20] [4].
Looking down the “timeline of cyber espionage & warfare,” the initial methods for
gaining intelligence/information and attacks bypassed human users and focused more on
vulnerabilities in the actual hardware and software. For example, in 2007 Russia executed
an attack on Estonia. That was a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, which
stopped the service by depleting the server of resources and damaging normal functioning
network parts [67]. The attack was accomplished by Russian hackers overloading Estonian
servers with information and causing sites to freeze. In 2008, an actual war and cyber
warfare took place together during the South Ossetia War/Russia-Georgia War. Amidst
the 2008 Olympic games, Russian troops invaded Tskhinvali and Abkhazia and shut down
most of Georgia’s media and government websites with a DDoS attack [36].
As time progressed, hardware and software defenses became more advanced. So, malicious attackers had to reassess their attack methods. In their reexamination, attackers
discovered another vulnerability, which was the human user. Malicious attackers have now
begun to install social engineering and phishing into their attacks. Perhaps one of the most
11

notable successful attacks in cyber espionage to date in the United States was the infltration of the Democratic National Convention (DNC) of 2016. This attack sent shockwaves
throughout the American political system. The damage done by this attack hit the country
similar to that which results from a category 5 hurricane. As with Katrina, Harvey, and
Irma, the country will be in clean-up mode for many years to come from this attack.
The logistics of this attack show how small erroneous details overlooked by humans
can have a catastrophic effect on information/cyber security. During the Clinton-Trump
election, on March 2016, one of Clinton’s campaign aides was forwarded a phishing email
originally sent to the chairman of the Clinton campaign. The phishing email in question
supposedly came from Google. The content of the email stated that the campaign chairman
should change his password associated with his personal email account. The campaign aide
was to advise the chairman on how to handle the email. However, in his advisement the
aide made two crucial mistakes. According to the aide, the frst mistake he made was a
typo. Instead of typing “illegitimate” he typed “legitimate” in his response to the chairman
about the phishing email. He committed his second mistake when he told the chairman
it would be a good idea to change his password. These two actions led the chairman to
change his password via the link in the phishing email. As for the aide’s second mistake,
he should have been more specifc and told the chairman to change his password directly
through Google. The results from these two human errors caused Russian hackers to gain
access to 60,000 emails, a decade’s worth of the chairman’s personal emails [60] [37].
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1.3

Research Questions
The damage that malicious cyber assailants have caused with social engineering and

phishing has proven to be cataclysmic. It is imperative that cyber defenses are developed, which incorporate human vulnerabilities. Researchers and practitioners are two
groups that have begun to realize that humans are undoubtedly the weakest link in the
cyber/information security chain, and both groups have started to give the subject much
needed attention. Some researchers have categorized this area as Human-Computer Interaction and Security (HCI-Sec or HCI-S) [48] [47] [9] [26] [66] [65] [44]. The area of
HCI-Sec will be explored more in the next chapter. However, the goal of this effort is to
fll a gap in the current research.
The next chapter will present many proposed methods for dealing with this issue, ranging from software and hardware improvements, to training and educational programs utilized by institutions, organizations, and companies. Nevertheless, as seen in the previous
election example in Section 1.2, attacks have continued to be successful. This means that
defense mechanisms still need to be improved. Hence, several research questions were
developed as the driving force for this research.
Before providing the research questions, some background information and defnitions
will be discussed. First and foremost, this work does not approach the human vulnerability
problem from a software or hardware perspective, but rather examines the user’s interactions. Specifcally, this work aims to examine the user’s security decision-making process.
Previous research has highlighted that one of the main problems in the user’s interaction
paradigm was the cognitive psychology concept of attention. Most researchers in the area
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of HCI-Sec agree that a lack of attention to details affects a user’s security decision-making
process. Moreover, researchers agree that the lack of attention to security symbols or indicators also impacts a user’s decision-making capabilities. Another cognitive concept
scholars agree on is knowledge, especially background knowledge [54] [47] [9] [26][66]
[43] [65].
This body of work sides with the notion that knowledge plays a critical role in a user’s
security decision-making process. However, when it comes to attention, a closer investigation must occur. First, a proper defnition of attention must be stated. The commonly
used defnition of attention is the ability to acknowledge a stimulus, either visual or audio,
which can ignite other cognitive processes. That is not suffcient. In this work, attention refers to perceptual attention, which is the ability to process a stimulus when there
are multiple stimuli present and which is achieved by proper alertness and encoding [46].
Alertness is an individual’s ability to establish and sustain heightened sensitivity to external stimulation. Encoding is an individual’s ability to identify or select a targeted stimulus
from among a group of distracting stimuli [49]. Alertness and encoding are two distinctive
functions that affect behaviors differently; however, these two functions operate in parallel
as effciently as if executed serially [49] [62] [46].
The research presented in this body of work agrees that when attention is defned as
above, it plays a critical role in a user’s decision-making process. The only argument is
that there is also another cognitive ability involved in the security decision-making process, inhibitory control. Inhibitory control can be divided into three categories: prepotent
response inhibition, resistance to distractor interference, and resistance to proactive in14

terference (PI). Prepotent response inhibition is the suppression of automatic responses.
Resistance to distractor interference is withstanding interference introduced by information from the external environment that is not relevant to the task at hand. Resistance to
PI is suppressing memory interruptions from information that was relevant to the previous
task but now is not [17].
This led to the following two research questions: What role does inhibitory control play
in a user’s cyber security decision-making process? Additionally, Can both attention and
inhibitory control account for users making bad cyber security decisions or vice versa?
From these research questions the following hypotheses were generated:
• (H1) Individuals with strong prepotent response inhibition make better cyber security
decisions, as measured by participants’ performance on the anti-saccade task and
security decision-making task.
• (H2) Individuals with weak resistance to distractor interference make bad cyber
security decisions, as measured by the performance of the participants on the Eriksen
Flanker task and security decision-making task.
• (H3) Resistance to proactive interference (PI) does not affect a user’s cyber security
decision-making process, as measured by the participants’ performance on the cued
recalled task and the security decision-making task.

Ultimately, social networking has ushered in a new form of communication, which
has altered the way the world functions. With this new form of communication came
social engineering and phishing, both of which have changed society forever. Section 1.2
used statistics to highlight the damaging effects caused by social engineering and phishing.
Also, some highly controversial media topics were discussed in Section 1.2 to illustrate
the damaging effects of social engineering and phishing. The last section in this chapter,
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Section 1.3, before outlining the research questions and hypotheses, gives a brief insight
into the logic from which the research questions and hypotheses were derived.
In chapter two, the background and related work are discussed, beginning with a brief
overview of Human-Computer Interaction and Security (HCI-Sec or HCI-S). Chapter two
also contains a short review of design and implementation advancements resulting from
the study of HCI-Sec, followed by a discussion of social engineering and phishing, and
a review of previous research to understand the phishing problem. Chapter three reviews
a preliminary experiment and results, where the goal was to determine whether humans
could identify legitimate URLs from fake URLs. Chapter four covers the theoretical background for the experiment in this research, and chapter fve covers the experimental procedures and analyses for this research. Chapter six presents the results from a user study
conducted. In chapter seven there is a discussion of the important results and the impact
of those results. This dissertation concludes with chapter eight and a presentation of the
conclusions and future work.
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CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK

This chapter begins with a brief discussion on Human-Computer Interaction Security
(HCI-Sec or HCI-S). This brief analysis covers the two areas, Human-Computer Interaction and Cyber/Information Security, which compose HCI-Sec. After that, HCI-Sec is defned, important principles are discussed, and a usability-security threat model is presented.
Also in this chapter, previous research is discussed and previous studies are analyzed in an
effort to highlight the wide spectrum of HCI-Sec-related issues. This chapter closes with
highlights of studies from Cognitive Psychology that are useful to HCI-Sec and can be
used to further improve the feld.

2.1

Human-Computer Interaction and Security
The area of Human-Computer Interaction Security (HCI-Sec or HCI-S) was created to

tackle the human vulnerability problem. HCI-Sec was defned as the study of the interactions between humans and computers as it pertains to information security. The primary
goal of Human-Computer Interaction and Security was expressed as inciting and motivating advancements in the usability of security features within end-user interfaces, which are
responsible for closing the gap among the user and the security features included within
a system or software [26]. In HCI-Sec the concepts and theories from Human-Computer
17

Interaction, along with the principles and philosophies of Cyber Security, are applied to
produce more secure and usable software or systems [26] [43] [40] [51].
For a long time, the areas of HCI and Cyber/Information Security were thought of
as two entities, which could not coexist in harmony. This was mainly because the goals
of HCI were to produce software or systems that create a pleasant user experience and
are easy to use (usability), and the goals of Cyber/Information Security were to produce
software or systems that possess confdentiality, authentication, integrity, non-repudiation,
availability, accountability, and authorization [26] [43] [40]. It was believed that the goals
of security were counterproductive to the goals of HCI. Now that these two entities have
been integrated, it is believed that HCI complements security. The evidence that supports
the previous statement comes from Gonzalez et al.’s [18] six principles for developing
secure usable user interfaces and Kainda, Flechais, and Roscoe’s [26] security-usability
threat model.
Gonzalez et al.’s [18] six principles are defned as follows: (1) visibility of the system status, (2) aesthetic and minimalist design, (3) satisfaction, (4) convey features, (5)
learnability, and (6) trust. With visibility of the system status the interface is tasked with
informing the user about the internal state of the system/software (for example, using messages or indicators to signal that security features are enabled). Aesthetic and minimalist
design refers to disclosing only relevant security information to users and avoiding the use
of technical verbiage. Satisfaction urges that security actions are easy to achieve and understand and includes presenting security issues to the user in a compelling manner while
utilizing the least amount of technical terminology. Convey features promotes the use of
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images and animations as the ideal method to clearly and precisely express which security
components are available. Learnability advocates that the user interface should be inviting
and easy to learn/understand. Lastly is trust. This criterion was expressed as the user’s
belief or ability to believe in the security of a computer system/software. These six principles presented by Gonzalez and colleagues were an ideal combination of HCI concepts
and Cyber/Information Security theories, which promote usability and security [18].
The security-usability threat model displays critical elements useful for the evaluation
of usability and security. In its current state, the model contains four elements, which relate solely to usability, and fve elements, which belong completely to security, and two
elements, which belong to both usability and security. See Figure 2.1 below for an illustration of the security-usability threat model recreated from [26].
Each of the elements listed in this paragraph are related to usability.

Effectiveness

states that a system is valuable only if users are able to attain their expected goal; Satisfaction refers to both objective analyses and the user’s subjective evaluation, but more
specifcally it refers to the users’ acceptability. Accuracy refers to the infuences of user
demands that are impacted by information recall and environmental or personal factors.
Effciency pertains to the user accomplishing a goal within a reasonable amount of time
and using a sensible amount of effort. Memorability is in reference to the multiple authentication processes and secrets a user must retain to authenticate and be granted access to a
system. Furthermore, the more systems a user interacts with that has increased memorability issues, the more frequently he/she must routinely reset secrets. Finally, knowledge/skill
concentrates on the user’s motivation or lack thereof when it comes to understanding the
19

Figure 2.1: The Security-usability Threat Model
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functionality of a system. Users are only motivated to understand the functionalities that
facilitate their goals, and in secure systems users do not view security operations to be
relevant to their needs [26].
The elements that belong to security are as follows: attention, vigilance, conditioning, motivation, social context, memorability, and knowledge/skill. Attention is centered
on the fact that a user rarely notices security indicators, and users view security tasks as
disruptive. Additionally, users are easily distracted, and this causes them to divert their
attention from the current task. Security tasks should not require the user’s total attention
because in the event of a distraction, security mishaps are common. Vigilance is the notion
that users are always aware and proactively ensuring that the system is in a secure state.
However, this is not entirely true because studies have illustrated that users are not always
alert, even expert users. Conditioning deals with the concern of constant/repetitive security
tasks that are predictable and can potentially be hazardous to a secure system. The concept that users have different levels of impulse/rationale to adhere to and perform security
tasks, which in some instances relate directly to the circumstances/settings, is known as
motivation. Social context pertains to how as humans, given the nature of one’s surrounding, environment, and/or group norms, users have a tendency to share security secrets (i.e.,
passwords). Memorability expresses that users are required to use optimal secrets that cannot be guessed or attacked through brute force. Because of this, the more systems a user
interacts with, the more secrets the user is required to remember, and this induces error.
To reduce errors, the user turns to the hazardous behavior of writing down secrets and/or
passwords. The last element, knowledge/skill, focuses on security errors made by users be21

cause the user does not possess the understanding or traits to differentiate between secure
and unsecure websites or entities [26].
From the defnitions, principles, and model discussed, it should be evident that HCISec applies to all phases of the development life cycle for systems or software. This also
includes, but is not limited to, the interactions of end-users, system operators, and IT personnel. Support for the previous statement comes from [66] and [65], which highlights
three key points. First, security and usability features should not be viewed as add-ons to
a product to improve or solve security issues, and it relates to implementation and design.
The second point promotes the notion that security and usability are both accountable for
accomplishing the user’s needs or expectations. As for achieving this goal, an agreement
between the system’s security state and the user’s mental state must be established and
maintained. This can be a diffcult task, due to the constant change over time between the
system’s security state and the user’s mental state. The integration of security decisions
into the user’s objective is the third and fnal point. This can be attainable through the use
of authorizations in the tasks presently part of the user’s primary goal [66] [65].

2.2

Design and Implementation Advancements
The foundation of HCI-Sec was discussed in the previous section; this section cov-

ers the important advancements derived from HCI-Sec. The frst issue to be reviewed
comes from [66] and [65]. It refers to design and implementation and states that security
should not be an add-on or afterthought. This essentially means that systems and software
developers must alter their current process to incorporate security features and demands.
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An ideal way to integrate security into the design phase is the OCTAVE process. The
OCTAVE process is composed of fve steps. Step one is to identify critical assets- establishing the information that is used and that must be protected. Step two is to defne
security goals. Using the information identifed in step one, apply the appropriate security
goals. Accountability, authentication, authorization, availability, confdentiality, integrity,
and non-repudiation (the guarantee of not being denied ensures that the contracted entity
cannot refuse the legitimacy of a document or message with their signature). Step three is
to identify threats. The STRIDE technique has been recommended for identifying threats.
See Table 2.1 for a description. Misuse Case Diagrams and Misuse Cases Descriptions
are also ways for identifying threats. Step four is to analyze risks by using the following
metric to rank the risk: Priority = Impact * Likelihood. Step fve, the fnal step, is to defne security requirements by incorporating security use cases and misuse cases to express
security requirements [35].

Table 2.1: The STRIDE Technique [35]
S

T

Spoof

Tamper

Identity

with Data

R

I

D

E

Repudiation

Information

Denial of

Elevation of

Disclosure

Service

Privilege

UML diagrams have been altered to assist designers and developers in improving software/system security. UML diagrams developed to enhance security are misuse case de23

scriptions and misuse case diagrams, mis-sequence diagrams, class diagrams, and misuse
deployment diagrams. A misuse case diagram is explained as an extension of the traditional use case diagram emphasizing security. The misuse case is composed of misusers
(i.e., malicious users, attackers), along with misuse cases (i.e., attacks on different use
cases), and security use cases that mitigate the misuse cases. Misuse case descriptions are
categorized as explanations of the misuse cases that outline the attack and security mitigation procedures. Class diagrams can also be modifed, with security classes or patterns
to highlight security aspects. Mis-sequence diagrams are described as sequence diagrams
that have been extended to depict conditional logic about how attacks transpire and are
settled. Additionally, state chart diagrams aid by ensuring integrity related to real-time
procedures, resulting in the avoidance of erroneous actions if the right package is received
at the wrong time. Misuse deployment diagrams are used to illustrate where major attacks
will occur during the requirements stage of the development cycle. In the analysis and
design stage, the diagram is elaborated with the addition of security software components
and supplemental attack information [35].
The STRIDE technique and the upgrades to the UML diagrams mentioned previously
are ideal for improving the security of the overall system or software. Likewise, the resource model in security is a great way to improve the security features of a graphical user
interface (GUI). The purpose of the resource model in security is characterized as taking
primary security goals and transforming them into primary security requirements that are
in the form of constraints on the functional requirements that are adequate to protect the
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assets from acknowledged maltreatments. There are nine steps to this approach, which are
as follows:
• Step 1: Defne the system’s security objectives based on the seven security principles
mentioned in Section 2.1 (see Figure 2.1).
• Step 2: Defne the system’s functional requirements.
• Step 3: Abuse/Exploit the security requirements in relation to the security objectives
and the functional requirements.
• Step 4: Compose several common scenarios, at least one for each functional requirement.
• Step 5: Identify the security components for the scenarios in the previous step.
• Step 6: Compose suffcient scenarios for all other security requirements.
• Step 7: Get users to evaluate the scenarios.
• Step 8: Observe and log user’s interactions with the system.
• Step 9: Evaluate the GUI. This step is where faults are identifed and alternate designs are explored [40].

One researcher, Yee [65], has identifed a set of principles that he deems crucial to
the development of a system or software, which extends to the design and implementation
of a GUI. This set of ten principles, composed based on the principle of least privilege,
also blends together ideals for both usability and security. The frst principle in the set
is path of least resistances, which states that the most common way to complete a task
must also be the most secure way [65]. Appropriate boundaries is the next principle. It
declares that the GUI must disclose, and the system must impose, the separations among
objects, actions, and between limitations that are of concern to the user [65]. Third is
explicit authorization, which states that a user’s authority should only be granted to another
user/actor via an unambiguous action that is understood by the user [65]. Visibility is fourth
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in this set of principles, and it states that the GUI is responsible for revealing any active
users and authority associations that are pertinent to the user’s security decisions [65]. Next
is revocability, which asserts that it is the role of the GUI to allow the user the ability to
revoke, with ease the authority that is granted by the user [65]. Principle six is expected
ability, which emphasizes that the GUI must possess the functionality of not appearing to
give the user the ability to complete actions/tasks that cannot actually be done [65]. Trusted
path is the seventh principle, and it states that the GUI is required to offer an unspoofable
(when a person, group, program, etc. poses as someone else using forged data to gain
improper leverage) and trusted transmission channel between the user and any other trusted
entity [65]. The eighth principle in the list is identifability, which refers to the interface’s
role of imposing that distinctive objects and tasks have unspoofable identities and unique
representations [65]. Expressiveness is principle nine, and it states, that the interface must
have the ability to 1) convey a security policy with a minimal degree of diffculty and 2)
provide users with a way to specify security policies that are aligned with their goals [65].
The last principle on the list is clarity, which states that the consequences of any security
action should be transparent to the user before the action is executed [65].
Fidas and Voyiatzis [14] developed a user-centric approach/methodology to produce
what they labeled “usable secure systems.” Fidas and Voyiatzis’ [14] approach does not follow traditional methodologies, i.e. waterfall; however, their methodology is more aligned
with design strategies from HCI. The authors’ user-centric strategy uses interaction models
that are made up of different steps/interactions the user must execute to accomplish his/her
primary task. For example, if a user desires to inquire about his/her account balance via
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online banking, the requirements are composed by generating a series of user interaction
models for this goal. In this scenario, the primary goal was to attain the account balance,
while security remained a secondary objective. This means the user has not associated
security as her/his responsibility (i.e., in this scenario security was viewed as the system’s
responsibility.) Likewise, if the task was to establish a frewall, then security would have
been the primary objective. The authors have asserted that an optimal user-centric methodology aligns the mental model of the user with that of the system [14].
In the banking scenario, the user’s password was a key component of the security. In
today’s time, most fnancial institutions require that users change their passwords occasionally as a security measure. Fidas and Voyiatzis [14] emphasized that the current method
for handling this issue is one of two ways, “always off” and “instant on.” Consequently,
the authors recommended an “always on” approach. The “always on” technique requires
security elements pertaining to the password to be handled by the system in such a way
that it incorporates it into a user’s primary task. By adapting the user-centric approach, a
better design would require the user, in the initial stages of setting up his/her online banking account, to create a component labeled “tip of the day” (or something to that effect),
which makes the user feel like password management (or any security-related features) is
his/her responsibility. This feature can regularly update the user with information related
to his/her password, for example policies, such as days left before next password change.
This user-centric methodology accomplishes the following: 1) grants the user direct access
to the system; 2) informs the user over time about his/her password; and 3) aligns the user’s
mental model with that of the system [14].
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In section 2.1, Gonzalez and colleagues’ [18] six principles (visibility of the system status, aesthetic and minimalist design, satisfaction, convey features, learnability, and trust)
for developing secure usable user interfaces was discussed. Not only did the authors establish these six principles, they also proposed fve models that make up a three-phase
methodology, guided by the six principles, to produce secure usable user interfaces. However, before examining the methodology, the Goal Question Metric (GQM) technique must
be explained.
Briefy, the GQM technique has three main objectives: purpose, perspective, and environment. Purpose can be summed up in one word, “goal;” in other words, analyze X for
the purpose of Y. Perspective can also be summed up in one word, “scope,” meaning with
respect to A from B’s point of view. Last is environment, and just like the other two it can
be expressed as one word, which is “context” related to a given situation. The GQM technique can be characterized as a multifaceted approach, which can be used as a framework
for developing good quality metrics [18] [3].
The frst model is the measurement model for secure and usable websites; it is based on
the GQM technique. The measurement model for secure and usable websites is composed
of a collection of non-exhaustive metrics designating a question-metric to each individual requirement and is supplemented with a mathematical formula. Next is the security
patterns to specify security schemes model. This is a collection of patterns used to assist the most novel developer in designing and planning phases of a website. Thirdly is
the evaluation metric for security requirements model, which supplemented the previous
model and is tasked with evaluating the attainment of specifc security requirements in a
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website. Interactive patterns to design security information feedback is the next model. It
advocates using libraries containing User Interface Patterns, which also revolve around the
six security principles mentioned in Section 2.1, to improve usable security information
feedback. The last model is metrics for usability evaluation in UIs of secure online systems. This model is a tool for measuring the results from the three previous models, and
it resembles the Goal Question Metric technique. These fve models are what make up the
following three-phase methodology: Diagnostic, Security, and Usability. See Figure 2.2
for a more detailed explanation of this methodology [18].

Figure 2.2: The Three-phase Methodology by Gonzalez et. al. [18].

In this chapter so far, a brief discussion on the background of Human-Computer Interaction and Security has been presented. In this discussion of HCI-Sec so far only the
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changes and advancements related to how systems and/or software are developed and implemented have been emphasized. HCI-Sec is not just confned to development and implementation, and it is not just a solution for designer and/or developer-induced security faws
or vulnerabilities. HCI-Sec also applies to user-induced security faws and vulnerabilities.

2.3

Social Engineering and the Phishing Problem
In Chapter 1 both social engineering and phishing were defned and explained. To

briefy remind readers, phishing is a malicious attack that uses social engineering to steal
a user’s personal or confdential information. From a security perspective, an organization
may have the most superb hardware and software defenses in place and still fall victim to a
social engineering and/or phishing attack. This is because phishing and social engineering
attacks commonly bypass software and hardware defense mechanisms [4] [47]. Additionally, phishing uses humans’ inexperience regarding their interactions with computers and
technology to its advantage to successfully accomplish its goal [47] [44]. According to
a report released by the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG), hundreds of companies
are common targets. This means that certain companies experience phishing attacks every
few weeks, while other smaller companies may experience phishing attacks sporadically.
APWG also noted that phishing attacks occur most frequently in the payment, fnancial,
and webmail sectors [4].
Regardless of a company or organization’s size, as discussed throughout this work,
phishing is grossly an end-user issue. Contrary to belief, phishing and other security vulnerabilities brought on by humans is not just an issue for naive end-users, but is also a
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problem for expert as well as technical users [47] [9]. The reasoning behind this statement
will be explored more throughout this section. However, from an abstract scope, there are
two common solutions to alleviate phishing attacks. The frst is user education. Here the
human user is trained/instructed on efforts to improve a person’s ability to correctly distinguish phishing emails and the suitable corrective actions to take. The second is software
enhancements. This is where enhancements are made to software to increase its ability to
classify phishing emails or reveal more information so that the human can better identify
the email as a phishing email [30]. Essentially, these two common solutions face the following challenges: 1) Non-technical users will exhibit apprehension toward learning, and
those users that learn will not permanently retain the knowledge, necessitating that training
must be a continuous effort; 2) Certain software solutions (for example authentication and
security warnings) rely on user behavior. The direct result of ignoring security warnings is
the software solution is deemed useless; and 3) Because phishing attacks are semantic in
nature and use natural language to con victims, the challenge herein lies with the extreme
diffculty computers have with understanding the semantics of natural language [30].
The two main ways of detecting a phishing attack are user awareness and software detection. Both detection methods must be used optimally to be successful. Ideally, the frst
method of defense is the software detection methods. It relies on user awareness as the
supplemental method, with the two working together to catch any phishing attacks, with
software detection used to circumvent possible problems with user awareness [52] [34]
[30]. By taking a closer look at the life cycle of phishing attacks, from an anti-phishing
perspective, mitigation efforts fall in one of three categories: offensive defense tactics, cor31

rective tactics, and prevention tactics. Offensive defense tactics are used to make phishing
attacks useless for the attacker by interrupting the attack. BogusBiter and Hunmboldt are
examples of offensive defense tactics. These are browser toolbars that submit false information to HTML forms when it identifes a phishing website. However, the actual detection
of the phishing website is done by a separate tool. Corrective tactics occur after the phishing attack is detected, and consists of removing the phishing resources. This is achieved by
reporting the attack to the ISP (Internet Service Provider). The following are resources of
a phishing attack (this list is not exclusive or exhaustive): websites, email messages, social
networking services, and public switch telephone networks (PSTNs)/voice over IP (VoIP).
Prevention tactics refer to inhibiting attackers from starting a phishing attack, as opposed
inhibiting victims from falling for a phishing attack. Prevention methods are actions taken
or put into effect by Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) [30].
When it comes to user awareness, this detection/mitigation category is multi-layered,
because there are some components of user awareness that are dependent upon software
features and some components that are independent of the software features. As a result,
an evaluation of both meta data and content data is needed to assess if an email is legitimate
or not [30]. Additionally, security warnings are a critical area where user awareness is dependent on the software component. User warnings fall into one of two categories, passive
or active. Passive warnings allow the user to view both the warning and content area/data.
On the other hand, active warnings prevent the user from viewing content area/data while
the warning is displayed. It has been proven that passive warnings are insuffcient based
on the results from [30]. In [30] Khonji, Iraqi, and Jones, focus was on the effectiveness
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of phishing security warnings. It was concluded that only 13% of participants followed
passive warnings, while 79% of users followed the active warnings [30].
Furthermore, when it comes to phishing not many of the typical users fully understand
phishing and the rest have yet to even know what phishing is. The rest of this section
and chapter will demonstrate that having a frm grasp on phishing helps average users
understand phishing-related warnings. It is the role of the system’s or software’s interface
to present warnings in such a way as to promote adherence and/or observance [64].
Being knowledgeable of phishing also aids user awareness for those aspects independent of software features because there are certain tricks that are visible to the user and are
easily detected if the user has suffcient knowledge and/or training. These tricks include
generic salutations, security promises, requiring rapid response or a “click here” link,
and links to https://domains. Generic salutations are the frst sign of an illegitimate email,
because offcial entities use personalized greetings to ensure trustworthiness. Examples
of general greetings look as such: Hello, Dear Customer, Dear Valued Customer, etc. In
the case of security promises, requiring rapid response or “click here” link, attackers use
security issues to bait the user. Insisting that the user login via a “click here” link, to collect
a user’s information, attackers indicate to the user that actions are required for security or
account maintenance (for example, out of date information, credit card expiration, validation). In efforts to collect the information before the attack resources are compromised,
attackers relay a sense of urgency by asking and requiring the user to respond fast. Links to
https://domains, phishers mislead users by posting false links with the domain containing
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https:// on the front end of the email, but on the back end of the email phishers transfer
users to an unsecure link [52] [44].
Software detection methods can be divided into three main categories. The frst is antiphishing toolbars that use varying techniques, depending on the organization, to evaluate
the authenticity of a website. Such techniques include, but are not limited, to checking
the IP address, heuristics, user ratings, and manual verifcation. The second category is
browser plug-ins, which also have varying techniques depending on the company. These
techniques range from, but are not limited to, blacklist, whitelist, phishing flters, and specially designed features and algorithms. The third category is email-flters. This method
of detection is the best method for detecting spoofed websites, because victims are commonly forwarded to a fake website via phishing emails. The mechanics of this method also
vary by organization, but these are specialized features designed to emphasize misleading
characteristics used to deceive users [52]. This work is focused on the human awareness
aspects of detection, specifcally, understanding which aspects contribute to an individual’s
security decision-making process.

2.4

Understanding the Phishing Problem
There have been more than ten studies conducted to understand the phishing problem

[54] [5] [64] [63] [53] [47] [32] [30] [20] [11] [10] [7] [31] [9] [44]. This section examines studies that emphasize understanding this problem from the human awareness aspect.
Researchers have realized that understanding the phishing problem as well as mitigating
this problem requires input from multiple disciplines. This can be observed through multi34

disciplinary research performed in the area and the use of principles and theories from
other disciplines to explain the phishing problem.
The frst study reviewed was conducted by Dhamija and associates [9]; this study was
conducted to explore why phishing was so successful. In their study, the authors identifed
the following cognitive dimensions used to increase the successfulness of phishing attacks:
insuffcient knowledge, visual tricks, and inadequate attention. Insuffcient knowledge was
defned as not having knowledge of computer systems and/or missing the knowledge of
security indicators. As for visual tricks, this category is divided into four groups: 1) visually distorted text, 2) images used to conceal the real text, 3) misleading use of browser
windows, and 4) deceitfully crafted websites. Lastly, inadequate attention was split into
two categories: the absence of attention to security indicators and the scarcity of attention
to the lack of or missing security indicators. Additionally, it was noted that skilled or expert users were often conned by visual tricks. Furthermore, it was revealed that some of
the participants were not aware that fabricating a website was possible, and, as a result,
did not question a website’s legitimacy. Also, it was revealed that some participants were
confused as to which website or browser features signaled that proper security measures
were in place.
Another study by Sheng et. al. [54] revealed that education and training have a positive effect on phishing; that is training and education improve a user’s chances of not
becoming a victim of a phishing attack. In this study, the authors note that before training,
participants, on average, succumb to phishing attacks 47% of the time. On the other hand,
after training, the participants’ rate was reduced to 28%, a 40% improvement. It was also
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exposed that women were more susceptible to phishing attacks, and participants between
the ages of 18 and 25 were more at risk. It was concluded that not only did women click
on phishing links more, but were more prone to proceed to give information to phishing
websites. This was attributed to women often having less technical training and knowledge
than men [54]. It was also concluded that participants in the age range of 18-25 had a lower
level of education, less years on the internet, less exposure to training resources, and less
aversion to risk [54].
Like the study that was just discussed, Kumaraguru et. al. [32] also demonstrated that
user education and training methodologies work to improve user awareness with respect to
phishing. In their study the authors had fve hypotheses they wanted to test. Kumaraguru et
al.’s [32] fve hypotheses were as follows: 1) users’ learning is facilitated when it is embedded versus non-embedded; 2) users absorb more knowledge on the avoidance of phishing
attacks when training is embedded as opposed to non-embedded; 3) more knowledge is
transferred when a user’s training is embedded instead of non-embedded; 4) users who
score high on Cognitive Refection Tests (CRTs) will have less of a tendency than those
users that score low on CRTs to click on phishing emails for companies/organizations from
which they have an account; and 5) in unique instances, users with high CRTs scores are
more prone than users with low CRTs scores to click the links within phishing emails from
companies/organizations with which they do not have an account [32].
The results from Kumaraguru et al.’s [32] study supported all of their hypotheses except for their fourth hypothesis, which stated that users with high CRTs will have less
of a tendency to click on phishing emails from familiar companies as opposed to those
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with low CRTs. Furthermore, the results emphasized that users were trainable when the
tactic was consistently designed and implemented learning science principles. The fve
learning principles were learning-by-doing, immediate feedback, contiguity principle, personalization principle, and story-based agent environment principle. It was revealed that
participants were more eager to learn when the training was presented after falling for a
phishing attack (embedded) rather than when sent as an email (non-embedded). Additionally, when the training material was sent in an email (non-embedded), some participants
deleted the email without reading its contents. The embedded method directly incorporated the two learning principles, learn-by-doing and immediate feedback. The results also
revealed that after seven days the participants from the embedded group outperformed the
non-embedded group. Additionally, the embedded group could apply their knowledge to
situations different from those in the training session better than participants in the nonembedded group. It was established that participants in both groups, high and low CRTs
scores, were equally vulnerable to clicking on links within a phishing email from which
they have accounts. Lastly, the results established that participants with high CRTs scores
were more inclined to click on links within phishing emails from an unknown organization.
This is because CRTs are related to an individual’s need for risk [32].
In a study by Schechter [53] and three of his colleagues, an evaluation of website
authentication indicators and the effects of role playing was analyzed. Specifcally, the
authors had six research questions, and the frst question was Will online banking customers
enter their passwords if the HTTPS indicator is missing? The next question was Will online
banking customers enter their passwords if their site-authentication image is missing? The
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third question was Will online banking customers enter their passwords when shown an IE7
warning page? The authors’ fourth inquiry was Do participants conduct themselves less
securely when playing a role versus not playing a role and using their own information?
Do participants act more securely when informed that the study is focused on security?
was the authors’ ffth question. The last question was Is it possible to ethically reproduce
the experience of a genuine attack in a usability study?
The study by Schechter and his colleagues [53] revealed that participants did not notice
the removal of the HTTPS indicator. In this phase of the study all the participants entered their passwords, and none of the participants commented about the HTTPS indicator being missing. The study also revealed that participants will enter their passwords
when their site-authentication image is missing. Furthermore, it was established that siteauthentication images can cause participants to overlook the other vital security indicators.
Due to the study design, the researchers were not able to accurately measure the effects of
the IE7 warning page. When it related to the effects of security priming, the results were
not signifcant enough for the researchers to fnd support or refute their theory. However,
the results indicated that role-playing can have a negative effect on participants’ security
behavior. Lastly, the authors did not confrm or deny the possibility of ethically reproducing a genuine attack in a usability study. However, the authors did point out the following
limitations: the study was conducted in a university setting, which may have caused participants to behave less securely as opposed to how they may have behaved in a real-world
setting; the consent form made participants aware that none of their sensitive information
would be recorded, which also may have caused the participants to behave differently; and
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the $25 incentive may have made participants feel obligated to complete/fnish all of the
tasks in the study [53].
In Section 1.3, perceptual attention was defned as the ability to process a stimulus
when multiple stimuli are present and achieved through proper alertness and encoding.
Alertness was defned as a person’s ability to establish and maintain heightened sensitivity to external stimulation and encoding was defned as the ability to identify or select
a targeted stimulus from a group of distracting stimuli. Also, the two theories FeatureIntegration Theory and Inattentional Blindness Theory were mentioned to highlight how
alertness and encoding work together. These two theories are quintessential starting points
for explaining the perceptual attention processes when one encounters a possible phishing
attack. Likewise, these theories help explain why some visual manipulations go undetected, with respect to phishing [44].
Treisman and Gelades’ [59] Feature-integration Theory established that separable features are detectable and identifable as a result of a parallel search, and conjunctive features are identifable and detectable through a serial search. Parallel searches reveal texture
segregations and fgure-ground groupings. Contrarily, to expose individual features requires extra operations, but if attention is deterred or depleted, then illusory conjunctions
(misleading/false representations/associations) can arise. Serial searches demand central
attention to be guided sequentially and entirely to signifcant locations, but serial searches
cannot reveal texture segregation (the separation of a visual stimulus into unique sections
due to spatial features and properties [21]). Texture segregation is not exposed until addi-
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tional spatial localization (the acknowledgement of a visual stimulus to a fxed location in
space [39]) happens [59].
Simons and Chabris [55] introduced the Inattentional Blindness Theory, which generally states that individuals fail to pay attention to unexpected stimuli that is perceptible
and in obvious sight. Results from the Simons and Chabris’ [55] study showed that when
engrossed in a monitoring task as the primary task, individuals may fail to acknowledge
continuing and highly apparent but unexpected events. Moreover, the authors’ study verifed that the degree of inattentional blindness is prone to detecting unexpected events if the
events are comparable in visual aspects to the events presently being attended. In simpler
terms, there are greater chances of noticing the unexpected action, object, etc. if it shares
similarities with the object(s) currently being attended. Lastly, items can pass through the
area of attentional focus and still may not be seen if one is not specifcally looking for the
targeted object [55].
Wang [63] and four of his colleagues conducted a study, which analyzed how humans
process phishing emails, particularly spear phishing emails. Wang et. al. [63] based their
research on the Theory of Deception that was developed by Johnson et. al. [25]. In general, the theory stated: Individuals comprehend deception by recognizing the discrepancies
among the deceptive events and his/her past experiences, that are compelled by cognitive
heuristics. In this context, cognitive heuristics refers to accumulated knowledge formations, declarative or procedural, in one’s memory [63]. There are four stages that must be
completed to acknowledge deception. Stage one, activation, was defned as observing the
deceptive material and discovering anomalies. The next stage, deception hypothesis gener40

ation, was described as the generation of explanations based on prior knowledge to explain
the perceived irregularities. The third stage, hypothesis evaluation, was expressed as the
assessment of the formulated explanations from the previous stage by some standard. The
last stage, global assessment, was explained as the integration of information resulting in
a single pseudo elucidation of the irregularities (a mock assessment of speciousness) [63].
Research has demonstrated that merely attending to cues is only the start to the detection of phishing. Moreover, individuals need to extend their efforts to the analysis of
perceived cues, making a conscious connection between the cues and their prior knowledge. This is known as elaboration. Additionally, it has been shown that people often
formulate heuristics to help interpret inconsistent cues when encountering deceptive situations. It has also been noted that, when it comes to phishing emails, visceral triggers are
used by attackers to override a person’s instinct of message elaboration. The use of visceral
triggers can induce judgment errors [63].
Visceral triggers are defned as impulse manipulation (i.e. stress, fear, urgency, etc.)
that attackers use to reduce the intensity/elaboration of information, which can cause decision errors to transpire. Heightened visceral impact modifes decision-making tactics, and
those changes can reduce rational thoughts along with cognitive deliberation. This simply
means that elevated visceral impact can cause individuals to forego consideration of the
consequences of their actions past fulflling the visceral desire. For example, fear may be a
factor. With this in mind, succumbing to phishing scams are a direct result of making judgment errors due to faulty information processing and decision-making. This means one
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must consider the following when processing information and during the decision-making
process: visceral triggers, phishing indicators, and security indicators [63] [33].
Wang and his fellow colleagues conducted a series of experiments, and it was determined that attention to visceral triggers increased the chances of responding to phishing
emails, but attention to phishing indicators decreased the chances of responding to phishing emails. The cognitive efforts that are extended for processing a phishing email were not
especially related to the chances of responding to the phishing email. Nonetheless, visceral
triggers and phishing indicators were the two key aspects affecting a person’s response to
a phishing email. It was disclosed that visceral triggers decreased the intensity of effort
that the receiver employed when analyzing the information within a phishing email, causing errors in the decision-making process. On the other hand, phishing indicators aided
and decreased the effort recipients needed to recognize the deceptive aspects of phishing
emails [63].

2.5

Conclusion
In this chapter, an overview of related work was discussed. This chapter opened by

defning HCI-Sec and a review of HCI-Sec. After the review of HCI-Sec, a brief review
of some of the security advancements to hardware and software because of HCI-Sec were
analyzed in section 2.2. Section 2.3 discussed the phishing problem, while Section 2.4
explored what researchers have done to understand the phishing problem. The next chapter
will present and describe a preliminary experiment that was conducted, to deterimine if
humans could detect the difference between fake URLs and legitimate URLs.
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CHAPTER III
PRELIMINARY SECURITY STUDY

1

This chapter reviews a pilot experiment that was conducted to assess an individual’s

ability to identify malicious URLs (links) from legitimate URLs (links) without the aid of
software or hardware. Also, it explored whether simple textual manipulations were easier
to detect as opposed to complex manipulations.

3.1

Theoretical Foundation
Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst [9] identifed three cognitive dimensions utilized as suc-

cessful tactics in phishing attacks: insuffcient knowledge, visual tricks, and inadequate
attention. Insuffcient knowledge was described as limited knowledge of computer systems
and/or limited knowledge of security indicators. Visual tricks fall into four groups: 1) visually distorted text, 2) images used to hide the actual text, 3) distorted use of browser
windows, and (4) deceitfully crafted websites. The last dimension, inadequate attention,
includes the absence of attention to security indicators and the lack of attention to missing
security indicators.
Dhamija, Tygar, and Hearst [9] established support for two of their predictions related
to the three cognitive dimensions. First, it confrmed that participants made inaccurate
1

The content of this chapter appeared in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and
Cybernetics (SMC).
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judgments because of insuffcient knowledge of computer system functions. A lack of
knowledge and the misunderstanding of security systems were also indicators that contributed to incorrect judgments. Second, the prediction associated with visual deception
was confrmed; the more skilled or expert participants were also deceived by visual tricks.
The third prediction pertaining to the lack of attention was not supported because their
study design prohibited this evaluation. An interesting aspect revealed from the study was
that participants did not know that fabricating a website was possible and, consequently,
did not question a website’s authenticity. Also, some participants misunderstood what
website/browser features indicated that security measures were in place.
Theories from cognitive science are relevant toward understanding why and how these
types of security concerns may occur. Five primary components were examined from
Treisman and Gelade’s feature-integration theory of attention research [59]. Those fve
components are as follows:
1. Visual Search - a perceptual task that demands attention and commonly requires
active scanning for a feature or target surrounded by other features known as distractors.
2. Texture Segregation - the division of visual stimuli by distinguishing between spatial
discontinuities among groups.
3. Illusory Conjunctions - the impact of incorrectly combining features when multiple
unattended objects are presented.
4. Identity and Location - the understanding that identifying an object and knowing its
position are two different operations, and that location must precede identifcation.
5. Interference from Unattended Stimuli - stimuli that is not being attended to only registers at the feature level. The degree of distraction it has on attended tasks depends
on the features it is composed of and should not be affected by any conjunctions
from where the features occurred.
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These fve components suggest that some textual manipulations and complex visual
tricks are harder to identify than others. Through experiments conducted by Treisman
and Gelades [59], it was established that separable features were detected and identifed
via parallel search, and conjunctive features were identifed via serial search. Treisman
and Gelade [59] established that parallel searches exposed texture segregation and fgureground groupings. However, to reveal individual features requires extra operations, but if
attention is averted or exhausted, then illusory conjunction may surface. Serial searches
require central attention to be guided consecutively and exclusively to signifcant locations,
but serial searches cannot expose texture segregation. Texture segregation is not uncovered
until extra spatial localization has occurred.
A second infuential study from cognitive science is based on research from Simons
and Chabris [55] associated with sustained inattentional blindness for dynamic events.
Inattentional blindness is when individuals fail to pay attention to unexpected stimuli that
is viewable and in plain sight. The results from their study established that when engaged
in a primary task of monitoring, individuals can fail to acknowledge continuing and highly
conspicuous but unexpected events. Their study confrmed that the degree of inattentional
blindness is prone to the detection of unexpected events if the events are similar in visual
aspects to the events currently being attended. The last important factor established by the
Simons and Chabris’ study was that objects may pass through the area of attentional focus
and still may not be detected if a person is not exclusively attending for that specifc object.
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3.2

Common Methods of Deception
The four methods of deception used for the preliminary study were the most common.

These four methods are additional text, crafted text, manipulation combination, and obfuscated text. Additional text can be described as a URL with too many or extra characters
(for example, wwww.google.com). Crafted text URLs include numbers, texts, or special
characters to deceive the user (for example, www.goog1e.com, in which the number one is
used to replace the lowercase ‘L’ in google). Manipulation combinations make use of multiple tactics to deceive the user (for instance, www.google.corn). In this example, ‘r’ and
‘n’ are used to form the m in .com. Also, the font size of the ‘r’ and ‘n’ have been changed.
Obfuscation describes the process of hiding a malicious URL behind a legitimate URL (for
example www.google.com there is a malicious URL hidden behind this hyperlink that can
viewed if the link is hovered over before clicking on it).

3.3

Design
This experiment was a within-subjects design, which evaluated the following hypothe-

ses: H1): The detection of additional text will be the easiest discrepancy to identify because
it can be done via a parallel search process. H2): The detection of crafted text, manipulation combinations, and obfuscated manipulations will be more challenging to identify
because these require serial search.

3.3.1

Participants

There were a total of 1,044 participants (N=1,044), ranging in ages from 18 to 60 and
older. A total of 580 males and 460 females completed the experiment; two participants
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selected no response; and two participants skipped this question in our study. One thousand
of the participants from our study came from Amazon Mechanical Turk and were paid
$0.40 for their participation, while 44 participants were unpaid student volunteers from
Alabama A & M University.

3.3.2

Equipment

The sample email messages and URLs were created using a MacBook Pro with a retina
display. The email messages were composed using a fctitious gmail account and the URLs
were composed in Microsoft Word from the Microsoft Offce 360 Suite for Mac. The survey was composed and hosted by SurveyGizmo. Participants could use their own devices
to complete the survey. Participants accessed the survey in one of two ways, by going to
Amazon Mechanical Turk or by direct access via SurveyGimzo through a web link that
was provided. Reaction times were logged using SurveyGizmo, but the results of this part
of the study are still being evaluated and not the current focus of this dissertation.

3.3.3

Stimuli

The URLs used in this study were composed using both serif and sans serif fonts,
which were used in isolation or in combination to create a single URL. The font size used
in Microsoft Word was 12; however, when the URLs were uploaded to SurveyGizmo the
font size was set to medium. For some of the URLs the size of the characters varied in
MS Word before going into SurveyGizmo as a part of their manipulation. There were ten
emails used in this study, containing two links from each category (additional text, crafted
text, manipulation combinations, obfuscation, and legitimate). Table I depicts examples of
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the links contained within the emails. The emails themselves were screenshot images from
a fctitious email account. Figure 3.1 shows an example of the screenshot images used in
this study.

Figure 3.1: Sample Email Image

3.3.4

Procedures

The primary task for this study was a role-playing exercise, where participants were
given the following scenario: As a participant in this phase of the experiment, you will
play the role of “Eli Jones.” You will be shown a series of images from Eli’s inbox along
with a series of responses. The task here is to evaluate the email as if it was your own,
and select the response or responses that best describe the action(s) you would take. When
selecting your actions, base your decision on whether or not you feel safe to click on
the link within the email. To advance to the next page click the “next” button below the
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Table 3.1: Common Methods of Deception & Examples
Legitimate

Additional Text

https://www.yahoo.com/

http://www.amazonn.com/

https://www.facebook.com/

http://www.bankoffamerica.com/

Obfuscated Text

Manipulation Combination

https://www.google.com/

http://www.grnail.com/

https://www.facebook.com/

http://www.yah00.com/

Crafted Text
http://wvvw.wellsfargo.com/
http://www.tvvitter.com/
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question. You may also click the “back” button, below the question, to access the previous
page.
After reading the scenario statement, participants were shown ten emails in a random
order along with a series of responses from which to choose. The choices were as follows:
click reply to reply by email, click the link, copy and paste the link, communicate with the
sender in person, delete the email or other (which allowed participants to write in their
responses). This entire study was designed to resemble an email usability study, but it was
actually a security study to test if lay users were able to determine the differences between
legitimate and illegitimate URLs.

3.4

Results
The frst step in the analysis process was to evaluate the manipulation check, which was

to determine if the participants were able to correctly identify the legitimate emails. Participants in this study were able to correctly identify the legitimate emails, which indicated
that participants attended to each individual email and passed the manipulation check for
this phase of the study. The manipulation check was done by rating participants’ responses
as secure (coded as 1) or unsecure (coded as 0) in the role-playing phase of this study.
Because we used a repeated-measures within-subject design with dichotomous variables, a Cochran’s Q was performed on the role-playing phase. This indicated a statistically signifcant difference in the proportion of participants who were able to accurately
differentiate legitimate URLs from fraudulent URLs, χ2 (9, N=961) = 1808.80, p<.001,
φ =.49 (medium-large effect size). This led to a pairwise comparison using a continuity50

corrected McNemar Test with Bonferroni correction and revealed a statistically signifcant
difference between the secure emails and all four discrepancy categories (additional text
emails, crafted text emails, manipulation combination emails, and obfuscation emails).
The results from these tests are shown in Table 3.2 and Table 3.3.
Table 3.4 displays the results from the pairwise comparison of the two crafted text
emails, which were statistically signifcant, and shows the proportion of participants who
could correctly identify the links as not being legitimate, χ2 (2, N=1016) = 16.76, p<.001,
φ = .19 (small-medium effect size). Table 3.5 shows the results from the pairwise comparison of the two manipulation combinations emails. Here, there was also a statistically
signifcant difference for the number of participants who correctly identifed the URLs as
not being genuine, χ2 (2, N=1020) = 26.45, p<.001, φ = .16 (small-medium effect size).
The pairwise comparison of the two emails in the obfuscation category also had a statistically signifcant difference for the participants who correctly identifed the URLs as not
being authentic, χ2 (2, N=1007) = 23.13, p<.001, φ = .15 (small- medium effect size) as
shown in Table 3.6.
The last pairwise comparison was performed between the two additional text emails,
and the results are shown in Table 3.7. Just as with the others, there was a statistically
signifcant difference in the number of participants who correctly identifed the links as not
being authentic, χ2 (2, N=1015) = 6.069, p<.05, φ = .08 (small effect size). [Note: The
differences between email1 and email2 in each category are (a) the type of email used (i.e.
solicitation or account related) and (b) the links used within each email. (See Table 3.1 for
examples.)]
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Table 3.2: McNemar Test (Pairwise Comparison) Results
Comparison

N

Chi-Square

Asymp. Sig.

Secure email 1 & Crafted email 1

1018

345.003

p<.001

Secure email 1 & Manip Combine 1

1018

175.006

p<.001

Secure email 1 & Obfuscated email 1

1010

510.002

p<.001

Secure email 1 & Additionalt email 1

1016

486.002

p<.001

Secure email 1 & Crafted email 2

1020

261.004

p<.001

Secure email 1 & Manip Combine 2

1024

250.004

p<.001

Secure email 1 & Additionalt email 2

1019

531.002

p<.001

Secure email 1 & Obfuscated email 2

1018

417.002

p<.001
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Table 3.3: Continuation of Table 3.2
Comparison

N

Chi-Square

Asymp. Sig.

Secure email 2 & Crafted email 1

1029

350.003

p<.001

Secure email 2 & Manip Combine 1

1027

176.006

p<.001

Secure email 2 & Obfuscated email 1

1018

511.002

p<.001

Secure email 2 & Additionalt email 1

1027

492.002

p<.001

Secure email 2 & Crafted email 2

1029

267.004

p<.001

Secure email 2 & Manip Combine 2

1033

255.004

p<.001

Secure email 2 & Additionalt email 2

1028

534.002

p<.001

Secure email 2 & Obfuscated email 2

1029

421.002

p<.001

Table 3.4: Pairwise Comparison of Crafted Text Emails
Crafted email 1 & Crafted email 2
Crafted email 2
Crafted email 1
Unsecure Action

Secure Action

95

253

168

500

Unsecure Action
Secure Action
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Table 3.5: Pairwise Comparison of Manipulation Combinations Emails
Manip Combine 1 & Manip Combine 2
Manip Combine 2
Manip Combine 1
Unsecure Action

Secure Action

96

78

158

688

Unsecure Action
Secure Action

Table 3.6: Pairwise Comparison of Obfuscated Emails
Obfuscated email 1 & Obfuscated email 2
Obfuscated email 2
Obfuscated email 1
Unsecure Action

Secure Action

Unsecure Action

281

225

Secure Action

133

368

Table 3.7: Pairwise Comparison of Additional Text Emails
Additionalt email 1 & Additionalt email 2
Additionalt email 2
Additionalt email 1
Unsecure Action

Secure Action

Unsecure Action

349

137

Secure Action

182

347
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3.5

Discussion
From the results of the pairwise comparisons in Tables 3.4-3.7 and the frequency data in

Table 3.8 (C. indicates crafted text, M.C. indicates manipulation combinations, O. indicates
obfuscated text, and A. indicates additional text), H1 was not supported as it turned out that
the simple visual tricks associated with additional text were the most diffcult to detect and
not the easiest as predicted. The results show that when given the second email from that
category the count for the additional text emails (A. Email1 and A. Email2) increased from
494 (48.1%) unsecure to 536 (51.3%) unsecure.
In H2, we predicted that more complex visual tricks (i.e., crafted text, manipulation
combinations, and obfuscated text) would be the most diffcult to detect. The category
of obfuscation (hidden links) was the second most diffcult to detect with the counts (O.
Email1 and O. Email2) showing only a slight decrease from 513 (50.4%) unsecure to
423 (41.1%) unsecure. Conversely the two easiest cases to detect were crafted text and
manipulation combinations, with the latter being the easiest. From Table 3.8 it can be
observed that the unsecure responses decreased in the case of crafted text emails (C. Email1
and C. Email2) from 352 (34.2%) to 269 (26.1%), but a small increase occurred in the
manipulation combinations emails (M.C. Email1 and M.C. Email2) from 178 (17.3%)
to 257 (24.9%), which was the lowest of all categories. In addition, looking at all the
categories together, it was interesting to notice that in the samplings involving the two most
diffcult cases, additional text and obfuscation, the overall performance had a 50/50 split
of secure versus unsecure responses. The only justifcation for the results we derived was
based on the write-in responses where participants indicated that the extra characters and
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Table 3.8: Frequency Data
Frequency Table
URL Types:

N

Unsecure

Secure

C. Email1

1029

352 (34.2%)

677 (65.8%)

M.C. Email1

1027

178 (17.3%)

849 (82.7%)

O. Email1

1018

513 (50.4%)

505 (49.6%)

C. Email2

1029

269 (26.1%)

760 (73.9%)

A. Email1

1027

494 (48.1%)

533 (51.9%)

M.C. Email2

1033

257 (24.9%)

776 (75.1%)

A. Email2

1028

536 (51.3%)

492 (47.9%)

O. Email2

1029

423 (41.1%)

606 (58.9%)
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other manipulations were spelling errors, or the participants did not attend to the security
cues. Another explanation, purely speculation, for the results from our study was that some
participants had more prior knowledge and awareness related to phishing, which they used
when selecting their responses.

3.6

Recommendations
After reviewing the results, it supported that another investigation should be conducted

into the security decision-making process. Specifcally, it will be prudent to investigate if
users are capable of determining whether the connection with different webpages is secure
or not, with the use of hardware and software utilities. Additionally, it is suggested that
future studies be as close to real-life experiences as possible. Lastly, it is recommended
that attention and other cognitive abilities be evaluated as well.
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CHAPTER IV
EXPERIMENTAL THEORY

The goal of this work was to investigate social engineering and phishing from the user’s
perspective. The experiments used in this study were looking for answers to the following
two research questions: 1) What role or infuence does inhibitory control have on a user’s
cyber security decision-making process?; and 2) Can both attention and inhibitory control
account for users making poor cyber security decisions, or vice versa? From these two
questions, there are three hypotheses that were evaluated:
• H1) Individuals that have strong/high resistance to prepotent responses make better
cyber security decisions, based on participants’ performance on the anti-saccade task
and the security decision-making task.
• H2) Individuals with low/weak inhibition to distractor interference make poor cyber
security decisions, determined by participants’ performance on the Eriksen Flanker
task and the security decision-making task.
• H3) A user’s cyber security decision making process is not affected by his/her resistance to PI (Proactive Interference), which is measured by participants’ performance
on the cued recalled task and the security decision-making task.
The purpose of this chapter is to present and explain the experimental theory of this
research. This study consisted of one experiment, which was composed of four tasks:
the anti-saccade task, the Eriksen Flanker task, the cued recalled task, and the security
decision-making task. The frst three tasks were used to measure participants’ inhibitory
control. The abbreviated description of the anti-saccade task can be stated as an exercise
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where an individual must refrain from the dominant response of looking at a visual cue
(the distracting object), in most cases on a computer monitor, in order to see the target
visual object [27] [17]. This task was used to evaluate participants’ inhibition to prepotent
responses [17]. The compressed version of the Eriksen Flanker task states that it is an exercise where an individual must correctly identify a target character, which may be presented
alone or with distracting characters [17]. The Eriksen Flanker task was used to determine
participants’ ability to suppress distracting interference [17]. The abstract version of the
cued recalled task can be stated as an exercise where an individual is shown one or two
lists that contain four words and the goal is to recall the word from the last list that belongs
to a specifc category, while ignoring the previous list(s) that serve as distractors [17]. This
task measured participants’ resistance to PI [17].
The security decision-making task, in short, is a series of specially designed exercises
and questions that an individual completes while visiting websites from links supplied by
the investigator. The security decision-making task investigates how participants make
judgments related to websites and their personal cyber security decisions. These tasks
were modeled and developed after reviewing a number of related studies [54] [5] [64] [63]
[53] [52] [48] [34] [32] [30] [20] [7] [31] [9] [44].
These tasks were used to answer the two research questions and evaluate the three
hypotheses presented in this work. Each participant completed all tasks in a laboratory
setting. The remainder of this chapter is divided into two sections. The subsections of Section One will defne each task, give some background information on each task, and offer
insight on how the tasks relate to security decision-making. Subsection 4.1.1 offers an in59

depth analysis on how prepotent response inhibition was measured. Next, Subsection 4.1.2
thoroughly discusses how resistance to distractor interference was measured. The method
used to measure resistance to PI is discussed in detail in Subsection 4.1.3. There is a comprehensive discussion on measuring the security decision-making process in Subsection
4.14. Section Two provides a conclusion for this chapter.

4.1

Experiment
This section reviews the experimental theory of this study on an individual task basis.

Each subsection starts by identifying what that particular task measures. Next, the subsection explains why the selected attribute might affect the security decision-making process.
Last, each subsection explains how each attribute was measured. Examples are included
for the more complicated tasks.

4.1.1

Task1: Measuring Prepotent Response Inhibition

Prepotent response inhibition is characterized as being able to consciously subdue
dominant, natural, or refexive responses [17]. Prepotent responses are actions that are
considered dominant responses or automatic responses to a stimulus. According to Friedman and Miyake [17], prepotent response inhibition is a merger of behavioral inhibition
and oculomotor inhibition, which function together. Behavioral inhibition manipulates demeanor and is observed in processes such as restricting motor responses and controlling
impulses. Oculomotor inhibition is the subduing of refexive saccades. Both behavioral
and oculomotor inhibition fall into the category of intentional inhibition, which means the
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response suppression does not occur until the stimulus has been deemed irrelevant [38]
[17].
Based on the defnition, prepotent response inhibition was considered to be signifcant
to the security decision-making process. Prepotent response inhibition was only one piece
of the inhibitory control puzzle, but it was an important piece because it helps an individual
maintain attentional focus in times of need or danger. Additionally, prepotent response
inhibition oversees behavior and emotions, and without this form of restraint people would
be at the will of impulse, and in a revolving state of danger of making bad decisions or not
having the ability to cope with complicated situations [38]. This means that individuals
that have a weak ability to suppress their prepotent responses will make hazardous security
decisions because of visceral triggers/impulse manipulations (i.e., stress, fear, urgency)
that attackers use to reduce the intensity/elaboration of information [63] [25].
There are three common tasks normally used to evaluate prepotent response inhibition:
the anti-saccade task, stop-signal task, and the stroop task [41] [38] [27] [17]. The antisaccade task was chosen for this study. This task was conducted with participants sitting
relaxed and in a stationary position. Participants had to identify a fashing target stimulus
for each trial and press the key that matches the target as quickly and as accurately as
possible. The target stimuli used per trial were capital B, P, and R. The left, right, and up
arrows on the keyboard were labeled with corresponding stickers. The right-hand was used
with the index fnger resting on the left arrow, the middle fnger resting on the up arrow,
and the ring fnger resting on the right arrow. This experiment contained two blocks: a
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response mapping practice block and an anti-saccade test block. In each block, the target
letters were presented an equal number of times [50] [41] [38] [27].
There were 18 trials in the practice blocks, where the target letter appeared in the center
of the screen. The anti-saccade test block was composed of 72 trials, with the target letters
appearing in a randomized order. The blocks began with a “Get Ready” (in white) sign
present in the center of the screen on a black background. This ready sign stayed on the
screen until the participant made a key press to signal he/she was ready to begin. After
participant’s signal, a blank screen was shown for 40 ms. Next, a red fxation/distractor
indicator (***) appeared on the left or right of the screen for either 200, 600, 1000, 1400,
1800, or 2200 ms. After the indicator, a blank screen was displayed for 100 ms, and a
white target letter appeared on the opposite side of the screen as the distractor appeared for
100 ms. The target was followed by a “?” that remained on the screen until the participant
gave a response. The next trial began with a 400 ms blank screen [41] [38] [27] [17].

4.1.2

Task 2: Measuring Resistance to Distractor Interference

Resistance to distractor interference is known as the ability to suppress interruptions
in order to complete an objective. Here interference refers to any interruption caused by a
clash of internal/external impulses [61] [62] [17]. Resistance to distractor interference is
comparable or related to interference control, which is defned as suppressing intrusions
resulting from resource or stimulus competition. Resistance to distractor interference has
also been related to alertness or encoding for target stimuli [17]. These minor but very
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crucial details about resistance to distractor interference are infuential and important to
the security decision-making process.
There are a few points that must be made to clearly highlight why the suppression of
distractor interference could be vital to the security decision-making process. Research
from computer/information security has already shown that security is not a user’s primary
goal [26] [14]; also, research has shown that visceral triggers affect a person’s reasoning
[63]. When these two facts combine, it can cause a person to suppress information because she/he has deemed it pointless, which ends in making a bad security decision. For
example, when checking one’s email an individual could come across a social engineering
or phishing attempt that is so alluring, it would cause the person to suppress any thoughts
not conducive to achieving one’s goal. One group of researchers [9] noted that even expert
individuals (as it relates to computer/information security) can be fooled by visual tricks.
Another group of researchers [44] noted that some visual tricks are harder to identify than
others. When combining the facts from [9], [26], [44], and [14] with what was stated about
resistance to distractor interference, it can serve as a possible explanation for making poor
security decisions. For instance, an individual, as she/he reviews an email, will not see or
will overlook the discrepancies because his/her need to do so is suppressed. Therefore, it is
crucial to establish whether the participants have a strong or weak resistance to distractor
interference.
When it comes to tasks used for measuring resistance to distractor interference, there
are various exercises from which one can choose. The Eriksen Flanker task, the word naming task, and the shape matching task are some of the most common tasks used. For this
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work, the Eriksen Flanker task was chosen. In the Eriksen Flanker task, participants must
respond as quickly and accurately as possible to identify a target letter that was presented
with or without distracting adjoining letters. There were four conditions: 1) distractor
same as target (HHHHHHH), 2) distractor similar to target (KKKHKKK), 3) distractor
dissimilar from target (SSSHSSS), and 4) no distractor (H). The letters were displayed in
all capital letters using a font size of 22, style of Courier, and bold-face letters. The space
between the letters was consistent with the spacing of the printed word [41] [38] [12] [17].
There were a total of 48 trials, which consisted of 16 trials for each condition. The
four conditions were mixed together in a random order. There were only two constraints;
no condition could occur in more than three consecutive trials, and no negative priming
trials. (This meant the current target could not serve as the distractor of the previous trial).
The trials were broken down into four blocks, and a practice block with 8 trials consisted
of all four conditions. Each trial began with a 1000 ms blank screen, followed by a 500
ms fxation cue (+). The stimuli were displayed, followed by the fxation cue, in white on
a black background. The stimulus remained on the screen until the participant responded
[41] [38] [12] [17].
The participant responded using the left and right arrows on the keyboard. The arrows
were labeled with stickers, right for H or K and left for S or C. Participants could rest the
index fnger of the right hand on the left arrow and the ring fnger of the right hand on the
right arrow. Also, participants were seated in the same position as in task one [41] [38]
[12] [17].
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4.1.3

Task 3: Measuring Resistance to PI

Resistance to PI is defned as the ability to suppress or resolve memory interruption
from information that was important previously to the task, but now is not. Proactive interference is categorized as any interruption caused by information that once was relevant.
This concept closely resembles what some researches call cognitive inhibition, which is
said to be the suppression of trivial information from working memory. Resistance to PI
differs from resistance to distractor interference in that the distracting information surfaces
ahead of the target and previously related to the assignment. On the other hand, with resistance to distractor interference the interrupting information arises in parallel with the target
information and is pointless [17].
It is believed that resistance to PI does not affect security decision-making like the other
two aspects of inhibitory control, prepotent response inhibition, and resistance to distractor interference. If you recall, PI is an interruption or distraction caused by information
that was previously relevant [17]. It is believed that previously relevant information does
not have a negative effect on the security decision-making process. For instance, thoughts
from reviewing one email should not have a big effect on reading/reviewing the next email,
instant message, or other. Also, relying on research from [48], [7], [26], [66], [43], and
[14], all of which agreed, in some capacity, that security needs to be integrated into the
user’s target objective or that software should aid the user in easily and effciently accomplishing his/her task. Adding those facts to the details about proactive interference, thus,
it is assumed that the PI a person experiences will not hinder him/her from completing
his/her goal or affect the security decision-making process. For example, an individual is
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reading what seems to be a malicious email or direct message and while reading this message thoughts from the previous email, relating to a party he/she was just invited to attend,
are still lingering. It is thought that those lingering thoughts (which are PI in this case)
would not be enough to cause the person to make a poor security decision.
Three of the most common tasks for measuring resistance to PI include the BrownPeterson task, the AB-AC-AD task, and the cued recall task. The cued recall task was
chosen for this study after comparing it to the Brown-Peterson task and the AB-AC-AD
task. The cued recall task is less demanding on participant memory load, because the
cued recall task uses a series of one or two short lists of four words, and the AB-AC-AD
task and the Brown-Peterson task require multiple and longer lists containing words and/or
word pairs. Due to the high demand of memory load associated with the Brown-Peterson
and the AB-AC-AD tasks, participants might become fatigued faster as a result especially
because of the number of trials that must be used in the training and test blocks [58] [17].
This experiment was divided into two categories, one-block trials and two-block trials.
In the one-block trial, participants were presented with a single trial including four words
presented in a serial order. The objective was to recall the word from the most recent list,
which corresponds to the cue. Each word was displayed on the screen for one second.
After the last word was presented and before the cue, participants completed a distracting
exercise for eight seconds. In the distracting exercise, participants were shown a three-digit
number and had to place the digits in descending order. The three-digit number was on the
screen for two seconds. There were eight trials where participants received one-block lists
before executing the distractor exercise and then had to recall the cued word. An example
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of the one-block trial was: “cattle, mint, falsetto, and ocean”; the distractor exercise “365”;
the cue herb. Participant had fve seconds to respond with the correct answer, “mint” [61]
[62] [58] [17].
There were eight two-block trials, where participants were shown two lists of words
with four words each before completing the distracting exercise and having to recall the
cued word from the most recent list. In this block, after the last word of the frst list
was displayed, the participant was prompted by a plus sign (+) that a second list would
be displayed. In these eight trials, the cue only matched one word in the last list that
was displayed. For example, given the following two lists: “golf, salt, tenor, and river”
and “beef, seed, mill, and black” the cue color only matches the last list. Additionally,
eight more two-block trials were used in this experiment, and in these two lists the cue
corresponds to a word in both lists. The participant was to recall the word that matched
the cue in the most recent list. For example, the two lists were “hot, medium, sage, and
water” and “winter, peanut, spoon, and dill,” and the cue was herb. The correct response
was dill, from the most recent list. All three trial types were presented in a randomized
order. Participants were given a one-block and two-block trial for practice [61] [62] [58]
[17].
The participants were given instructions on how to read each block, silently or aloud.
The two-block trials were read aloud-silently, meaning before the frst word in each list
was displayed, instructions appeared on the screen. “Aloud” appeared before the frst list,
and “silent” appeared before the second list. The one-block trials were read aloud. “Aloud”
appeared before the frst word in each list on the one-block trials [61] [62] [58] [17].
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4.1.4

Task 5: Measuring the Security Decision-making Process

The security decision-making process is defned as the cognitive steps/procedures executed during an individual’s security ceremony and while he/she was navigating the web
[48]. The term security ceremony refers to the interactions a user has with the following:
multiple security protocols, numerous system protocols, and other human users [48]. An
increase in the number of events in a person’s security ceremony increases the chances for
mistakes in an individual’s security decision-making process, or it can lead to unsafe practices [14]. For example, passwords are used to authenticate a user to a system/software.
The more systems that users must interact with and authenticate may cause them to forget or confuse their password(s). This could also lead to bad practices, such as writing
down passwords. Another example of bad practices that could stem from one human user
interacting with multiple human users is the sharing of passwords.
Understanding the security decision-making process is vital to advancing the development of systems and/or software along with improving cyber/information security [54]
[5] [63] [48] [32]. The design and implementation of the GUI is one area that has benefted and can beneft from learning what happens during the security decision-making
process. Improvements to the GUI not only enhances the software or system but it also
promotes better security as well. The sole jobs of the interface are to aid the user in
completing his/her goals as effciently as possible and to communicate any information
pertaining to the system that the user needs to know. The biggest changes that researchers
have learned about the security decision-making process are associated with the use of

68

security icon/indicators, the establishment of digital certifcates, and the integration of site
authentication images, etc. [53] [48].
There is a demand for a better understanding of the security decision-making process
because human error continues to be the biggest security vulnerability. The increasing
number of individuals and organizations that become victims of cybercrimes has convinced
researchers and security/technology professionals of the need to further understand the
security decision-making process [48] [47] [24] [11] [7] [31] [29] [9] [26] [43] [40] [44].
The constant evolution of social engineering and phishing attacks is an additional factor,
which establishes the growing need to maintain this investigation [54] [5] [64] [63] [52]
[34] [32] [30] [20] [10].
It is crucial to measure the security decision-making process as accurately as possible. A specially designed exercise labeled the security decision-making task was used in
this study. This assignment was composed of a series of exercises a participant had to
complete, and was designed to investigate if users were using software security indicators
and/or icons when making decisions about the legitimacy of websites. The answers to
the questions from the security decision-making task examined if participants were using
security indicators before executing security sensitive actions (i.e. entering passwords).
The security decision-making task was designed to appear as a user interface usability
study, and it required participants to use their personal account information. This was to
ensure that participants were unaware of the security aspect of the study. The questions
in the security decision-making task did not solicit/record any personal and/or sensitive
information. The security decision-making task was composed of one practice exercise
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and six target exercises, making a total of seven exercises and a collection of post-exercise
questions. The following is a sample exercise from the security decision making task:
• Choose your online banking system from the provided list.
• How many local branches are in your area?
• What is the total number of ATMs in your area?
• What is the phone number to the local branch?

The following questions are samples from the post-exercise questionnaire:
• Was it diffcult to determine the number of local branches in your area?
• Did you fnd the number of ATMs easily?
• Did you have a secure connection when you executed the personal banking exercise?
• How did you establish that your connection was secure?

The design of the security decision making task was based on previous research. In [53]
it was established that role-playing has a negative effect on a participant’s security behavior.
This was as close to a “real world” interaction that can be achieved in a laboratory setting.
The exercises in this task were modeled after those used in [53]. This design also imposed
minimal risk to participants. The risks associated with the actions in this exercise were the
same for participants if they were completing these actions using their personal computers
in a natural environment.

4.1.4.1

Perceptual Attention

Perceptual attention is the ability to interpret a stimulus when multiple stimuli are
present, which is accomplished via alertness and encoding [46]. Alertness is responsible
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for establishing and sustaining an elevated sensitivity to stimuli, and encoding is accountable for categorizing or selecting a marked stimulus from a group of opposing stimuli.
Research has shown that the process of alertness occurs before the process of encoding
[62] [46]. Results from Palmer [42] showed that the context or environment in which the
visual stimuli are presented infuences perceptual attention. It was determined that the
context can cause misjudgments in the encoding process [42].
Faulty encoding can have a negative effect on the security decision-making process.
Moreover, errors made during the encoding phase can cause poor security decisions to
be made. This is based on the Theory of Deception. This theory explicitly states that
in order to detect fraud/dishonesty one must notice and select the anomalies [63] [25].
Poor grammar, spelling mistakes, and fake email addresses are anomalies or key indicators
that show signs of deception, specifcally phishing. Observing security indicators such as
the padlock icon, https, digital signatures, etc. is imperative for distinguishing between
authentic emails and websites from fraudulent emails and websites. The cognitive load
can be reduced by noticing phishing indicators [63].
This work does not measure participants’ perceptual attention abilities. Instead, this
work assesses if participants are observing the security indicators/icons, and if the participant uses the observation in his/her security decision-making processes. This was measured in the security decision making task via an eye tracker. As participants completed
each exercise of the security decision-making task, eye tracking data was collected. The
fxations on the security indicator/icons, as well as the answers to the questions in the post-
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exercise questionnaire, established if participants used the security indicators/icons in their
security decision-making processes.

4.2

Conclusion
This chapter has covered the theory behind the four tasks used to answer the research

questions and evaluate the hypotheses. Section 4.1.1 discussed the use of the anti-saccade
task to measure prepotent response inhibition, which is the subduing of refexive responses.
The use of the Eriksen Flanker task to measure resistance to distractor interference, which
is the suppression of interruptions from irrelevant information, was covered in Section
4.1.2. Section 4.1.3 covered resistance to PI and the cued recall task, as a means for
measuring the resolve of interference from relevant information. The last section, Section
4.1.4, reviewed the security decision-making process along with a specially designed task
labeled the security decision-making task that measured this process.
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CHAPTER V
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE

The purpose of the chapter is to explain the methods used in the laboratory to conduct the experiment executed as part of this research. The sections and subsections of this
chapter cover the participants, equipment, pre-experimental measures, experimental measures, experimental design, experimental procedure, and post-experimental activities for
each task in this experiment. Section 5.1 discusses the participants used in this experiment,
while Section 5.2 covers the equipment used to conduct each task. The pre-experimental
measures are reviewed in Section 5.3. The details of each task are explained in Section 5.4
and its subsections. Section 5.5 covers the post-experimental procedures. Lastly, Section
5.6 is the conclusion of this chapter.

5.1

Participants
Before participating in this study, prospective participants completed the “Selection

Criteria Survey” to determine if they met the conditions to engage in this study. This survey can be found in Appendix A.
Selection: This short three-question form was used to determine if an individual was eligible to participant in this study. Potential participants were asked if they speak English
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fuently; if he/she has a Gmail account; and if she/he has used online banking. All individuals that answered yes to all of the questions were allowed to participant in this study.
A power analysis was conducted in G-Power3 for a regression with a medium-effect
size, and it was determined that the total number of participants needed for this study
was 45. (Note: The actual number of participants used in this study was 83.) Additional
participants were added to ensure that the number of participants did not fall below the
actual number reported by the power analysis due to the omitting of participant’s data for
any unforeseen circumstances.

5.2

Equipment
PsychoPy software was used to design the anti-saccade, Eriksen Flanker, and cued

recall tasks [45]. The security decision-making task was designed with the Gazepoint
Analysis Professional Edition. The tasks were designed using both a MacBook Pro with
a retina display and a Lenovo all-in-one with 16 GB of RAM and an i7 processor. The
tasks were performed on a Lenovo all-in-one with 16 GB of RAM and an i7 processor. A
Gazepoint GP3 60 Hz system, with 0.5-1 degree of visual angle accuracy, eye tracker was
used to collect eye tracking data.

5.3

Pre-experimental Procedures and Measures
Before completing the tasks in this experiment participants had to complete two forms.

All selected participants had to give their consent to participate by reviewing and signing
the informed consent form. Additionally, participants had to complete a standard demographics survey. The consent form and demographic survey can be found in Appendix A.
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IRB-approved Consent Form: All eligible participants read, signed, and returned this
form before engaging in this study. This consent document informed participants as to
whom the principal investigator was, as well as the purpose of this study. Additionally, this
consent document outlined the procedures that took place in the laboratory. The risk associated with participation, the confdentiality clause, the state of voluntary participation,
and the consent statement were also covered in this form.
Demographics: All participants answered standard questions such as gender, age, occupation, education level, and ethnicity. Aside from those standard questions, participants had
to answer questions related to their computer usage. Specifcally, participants were asked
about their interactions with the internet and email.

5.4

Experimental Protocols
This section covers the four tasks, which comprised this experiment. The subsections

of this section cover each of the four tasks, starting with the anti-saccade task. The next
task covered in this section is the Eriksen Flanker task. The third task in this section is the
cued recall task. The fourth task covered in this section is the security decision-making
task.

5.4.1

The Anti-Saccade Task

This task was used to measure participants’ ability to inhibit prepotent responses. Earlier studies aimed at understanding social engineering and phishing problems did not consider the effects that inhibitory control had on one’s security decision-making process. So,
the following hypothesis is offered:
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• (H1) Individuals with a strong prepotent response inhibition make better cyber security
decisions, as measured by participants’ performance on the anti-saccade task and the
security decision-making task.

5.4.1.1

Task Measures

All participants were required to correctly identify a target letter, which was presented
on the screen opposite the cue/distracting object. Participants used the designated arrow
keys on the keyboard to respond as quickly and accurately as possible to each trial in the
anti-saccade task. There was a response mapping practice block with 18 trials, where
participants rehearsed using the arrow keys to respond to a letter presented on the screen.
After the practice trials, participants completed the anti-saccade test round. The error rate
was used as the dependent measure for this task.

5.4.1.2

Task Design

All participants completed the anti-saccade test block, which was composed of the 72
trial rounds, which is based on the literature. Thus, this was a within-subjects design.

5.4.1.3

Task Procedure

Once the participant completed the IRB-approved consent form from the pre-experiment
procedures, he/she was directed by the investigator to take a seat at the computer to begin
this task. The investigator gave the participant instructions on how to complete the antisaccade task. At this time, the participant was allowed to ask any questions related to the
task. After the participant acknowledged that he/she understood how to complete the task,
the task began with the response mapping practice block. Following the practice block, the
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participants completed the test block. Immediately after fnishing the test block, participants were informed that this part of the study was over and they were allowed to take a
short break if needed before preparing for the next task in this experiment. Figure 5.1 is a
depiction of one example of what was displayed on the screen during the practice round of
the anti-saccade task.

Figure 5.1: Anti-Saccade Task Example

5.4.2

The Eriksen Flanker Task

This task was used to measure participants’ resistance to distractor interference. The
suppression of distractor interference is the second component of inhibitory control examined in this experiment. This task was related specifcally to the following hypothesis:
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• (H2) Individuals with weak resistance to distractor interference make bad cyber
security decisions, as measured by the performance of the participants on the Eriksen
Flanker task and the security decision-making task.

5.4.2.1

Task Design and Measures

Each participant had to identify a target letter that was presented in one of three ways.
The three conditions were 1) distractor similar to target, 2) distractor dissimilar to target,
and 3) no distractor. Participants used the arrow keys on the keyboard to identify the
target letter. This task was divided into a practice phase (8 trials) and a test phase (48
trials) and was designed based on the literature. The test phase was broken down into four
blocks, with 12 trials per condition. Both the practice and test phases consisted of all three
conditions in a random order. The reaction times were used as the dependent measure for
this task. This was a within-subjects design.

5.4.2.2

Task Procedures

The investigator explained the task to the participants, and at that time participants were
allowed to ask any questions related to this task. Once the participants fully understood
the task, they were allowed to begin the Eriksen Flanker task. The participants completed
both the practice and test blocks of this task. After fnishing the test block, the investigator
informed the participants that this task was complete, and the participants were allowed to
take a short break if they needed to before the next task started. Figure 5.2 is one example
of what was displayed on the screen for the Eriksen Flanker task.
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Figure 5.2: Eriksen Flanker Task Example

5.4.3

Cued Recall Task

The third task used to measure participants’ resistance to PI was the cued recall task.
Resistance to PI was the last component of inhibitory control to be investigated. This
branch of inhibitory control is believed to not affect the security decision-making process.
This task focused on the following hypothesis:
• (H3) Resistance to PI does not affect users’ cyber security decision-making process,
as measured by participants’ performance on the cued recalled task and the security
decision-making task.

5.4.3.1

Task Measures

All participants were required to correctly recall the target word, which corresponded to
the cue given. There were a total of 24 trials divided into three groups of eight containing
one list of four words (one-block trial) and two groups of trials with two lists of four
79

words (two-block trial). The number of correctly recalled words was used as the dependent
measure for this task.

5.4.3.2

Task Design

Each participant completed the cued recall task, which was composed of a practice
phase and a test phase. The test phase contained 24 trials that were divided into three
groups of eight, which increased in diffculty and was based on literature. There was one
group where participants only saw one list of four words, and two groups where participants saw two lists of four words. The difference between the two was in the latter of the
two groups where the cue matched a word in both lists as opposed to just one word in the
second list. Thus, this was a within-subjects design.

Figure 5.3: Cued Recall Task Example
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5.4.3.3

Task Procedures

The investigator explained the task to participants including how to engage in the task
and how to respond to the task. After the investigator explained the task to the participants,
the participants were allowed to ask questions and acknowledge that they understood what
was expected of them during this task. Participants started with the practice trials, which
was a mixture of both one-block and two-block trials. The test trials followed the practice
trials, and the test trials were presented to participants with the one-block, and then the
two-block trials. The words in both the one-block and two-block trials were in random
order. The investigator monitored the participants as they completed this task. This task
ended once the last trial of the test phase was completed. Next, the investigator informed
the participants that they had fnished the task and answered any questions from the participants. The participants were allowed to take a break if needed. Next, the participants
began the security decision-making task. Figure 5.3 is one example of what was displayed
on the screen for the cued recall task.

5.4.4

The Security Decision-making Task

This task was used to query participants’ security decision-making process. This task
was used to answer the following research questions: 1) What role or infuence does inhibitory control have on a user’s cyber security decision-making process? and 2) Can both
attention and inhibitory control account for users making poor cyber security decisions, or
vice versa? This task was used with the cofactors from the previous three tasks to evaluate
the following:
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1. (H1) Individuals with strong prepotent response inhibition make better cyber security
decisions, as measured by participants’ performance on the anti-saccade task and
security decision-making task.
2. (H2) Individuals with weak resistance to distractor interference make bad cyber
security decisions, as measured by the performance of the participants on the Eriksen
Flanker task and security decision-making task.
3. (H3) Resistance to PI does not affect users’ cyber security decision-making process,
as measured by participants’ performance on the cued recall task and the security
decision-making task.

5.4.4.1

Task Measures

All participants completed this task, which was composed of six short exercises. Each
exercise had a series of tasks and 3-5 questions to answer. From the 3-5 questions answered
after each exercise, 2-3 of the questions were related to security and the others were distractor questions. It was the responses to the 2-3 security-related questions that were used
to evaluate the security decision-making process.
Additionally, eye tracking data was collected. The eye tracking data collected were
fxations and the average portion of time spent looking at the security indicators versus
time spent looking at the screen while completing the exercises in the security decisionmaking task. Only the latter was used as dependent measures for perceptual attention.

5.4.4.2

Task Design

Each participant completed this task, which consisted of six short exercises. This task
was split into two phases a practice phase and a test phase. There was one exercise in the
practice phase and six in the test phase and was based on literature. Therefore, this was a
within-subjects design.
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5.4.4.3

Task Procedure

At the start of the security decision-making task, the investigator explained to participants how to complete the six exercises. After the investigator fnished explaining the task
to the participants, the participants were allowed to ask questions related to the completion
of this task. Once the participants established that they understood the task, they began
the task. The task started with the practice exercise and following the practice exercise
were the test exercises. The investigator monitored the participants as they completed the
security decision-making task. This task was concluded when the participants completed
the last exercise in the test phase. Next, the participants had to complete the post-security
questionnaire. Figure 5.4 shows a screenshot of one of the exercises used in this task,
which was to login to their Gmail account.

Figure 5.4: Security Decision-making Task Example
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5.5

Post-Experimental Procedures and Measures
After participants fnished the fourth task of the study, they completed a short question-

naire. This questionnaire was composed of 15 multiple-choice questions. These questions
were used to evaluate participants’ pre-existing knowledge of cyber security. Additionally,
participants completed an exit survey to evaluate their experiences during this experiment.
Also, the exit survey evaluated the conduct of the investigator during the process of this
experiment. Once the survey was completed the participants were debriefed and allowed to
ask any questions as this concluded the experimental process. The security questionnaire
and exit survey can be found in appendix A.

5.6

Conclusion
This chapter explained the four tasks that were used in this experiment to answer the

research questions and evaluate the hypotheses presented in this work. The frst three
tasks determine participants’ inhibition of prepotent responses, resistance to distractor inference, and resistance to PI. Sections 5.4.1 through 5.4.1.3 cover the anti-saccade task.
Sections 5.4.2 through Section 5.4.2.2 address the Eriksen Flanker task, while Sections
5.4.3 through 5.4.3.3 cover the cued recall task. The fourth task, the security decisionmaking task, is covered in Sections 5.4.4 through 5.4.4.3. Lastly, the post-experimental
procedures and measures are discussed in Section 5.5.
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CHAPTER VI
RESULT

This chapter is a discussion of the data collected from the four tasks conducted in this
experiment as well as the results from the statistical analyses performed on the data. The
analyses were conducted using Microsoft Excel from the Offce 365 edition for macOS
and IBM SPSS. This chapter is divided into nine main sections. Section 6.1, Statistical
Procedures, identifes the statistical analyses used and outlier analyses. Section 6.2 is a
discussion of the participants. Section 6.3, Measuring Prepotent Response Inhibition, is a
discussion of the results from the anti-saccade task. The results from the Eriksen Flanker
task are discussed in Section 6.4, Measuring Resistance to Distractor Interference. The
results from the cued recall task are examined in Section 6.5, Measuring Resistance to
Proactive Interference. Section 6.6, Measuring the Security Decision-making Process, is
where the results from the security decision-making task are discussed. Section 6.7, Measuring the Effects of Inhibitory Control and Perceptual Attention, contains the results from
the linear multiple regression. Section 6.8 presents the results related to participants’ cyber
security knowledge, and Section 6.9 is the Conclusion.
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6.1

Statistical Procedure
This experiment examined the effects of inhibitory control and perceptual attention on

cyber security decision-making processes. Inhibitory control was divided into three subcategories: prepotent response inhibition, resistance to distractor interference, and resistance
to PI. This experiment used three tasks to measure the three subcategories of inhibitory control and eye tracking data to measure perceptual attention. The security decision-making
task was used to measure participants’ cyber security decision-making processes. To evaluate whether the three subcategories of inhibitory control and/or perceptual attention could
account for the variation in the cyber security decision-making processes, a linear multiple
regression was the appropriate statistical analysis to determine these results. The dependent variable was the security decision-making task, while the independent variables were
the three tasks used to measure the subcategories of inhibitory control and the eye tracking
data was used to measure perceptual attention.

6.1.1

Data Trimming and Outlier Analyses

Data from four participants had to be removed. One participant’s data was removed
from the analysis because he did not complete Task4, the security decision-making task.
Specifcally, this participant only completed three out of the six exercises in Task4. The
next participant’s data had to be removed because he only completed fve out of the six
exercises in Task4. The third participant’s data was removed because his eye tracking data
was corrupted for three of the exercises in Task4. The last participant’s data had to be
removed because her eye tracking data was corrupted for four of the exercises in Task4.
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To ensure that extreme scores were not overly infuencing the results, an examination of
the multivariate correlations for outliers using leverage, studentized residual, and Cook’s D
values was conducted. This assessed how much infuence a single observation has on the
correlation [17]. Five percent (four) of the observations had extreme values. These values
were removed and the multivariate correlations were reexamined. The results were similar
for the multivariate correlations, with only a 14% decrease (ET Data and Task4, [r =.196, n
= 74, p < .05). For this reason, no observations were removed from this reported analysis.

6.2

Participants
A power analysis was conducted in G-Power3 for a regression with a medium-effect

size to determine the number of participants needed for this experiment. It was determined
that a total of 45 participants was needed. However, data from 83 participants was collected, in the case that any participant’s data had to be removed due to any unforeseen
circumstances. The remainder of this section will review the demographic breakdown of
the participants in this experiment.
There were a total of 51 female participants (61%) and a total of 32 male participants
(39%). These results are depicted in Figure 6.1. Participants ranged in age from 18 to
49. Figure 6.2 is a depiction of participants’ education levels. A total of 80 participants
were college students (96%). There was one participant with a bachelor’s degree (1%),
one participant with a masters degree (1%), and one participant with a doctor of philosophy degree (1%). Figure 6.3 shows the ethnic diversity of the participants. In addition to
traditional demographic questions, participants answered questions related to their internet
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Figure 6.1: Participants
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Figure 6.2: Education Level
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Figure 6.3: Ethnicity
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Figure 6.4: Internet Usage
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Figure 6.5: Browser Choice
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Figure 6.6: Email Usage
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usage. When asked how often they used the internet 83 participants (100%) reported daily
use. When asked to rate, in hours, their internet usage, 34 participants (41%) answered
two to three hours a day, while 23 participants (28%) answered three to four hours a day.
Only 11 participants (13%) reported using the internet one to two hours a day, and 15 participants (18%) reported using the internet for more than four hours a day, See Figure 6.4.
Participants were also asked to identify which web browser they used regularly (see Figure 6.5). A total of 49 participants (59%) listed Google Chrome as the browser they used
regularly, while 21 listed Safari (25%) as their main web browser. Other browsers listed
were Internet Explorer, with eight participants (10%) reporting it as their main browser;
three participants Mozilla (FireFox) (4%); and two participants used Microsoft Edge (2%),
as the least used browsers. Because this experiment investigated phishing, participants had
to report email usage. A total of 81 participants (97.6%) reported using email on a daily
basis, and only two participants (2.4%) reported using email on a weekly basis. Lastly, 41
participants (50%) reported spending 15 minutes or less checking email. There was a total
of 20 participants (24%) who reported spending 30 minutes to check email. There were
16 participants (19%) who reported spending one hour to check emails, while only six
participants (7%) reported spending more than one hour to check emails (refer to Figure
6.6).

6.3

Measuring Prepotent Response Inhibition
This section discusses the task, along with the results from the task, used to measure

prepotent response inhibition. The anti-saccade task was used to measure prepotent re94

sponse inhibition. In this task, participants had to identify the target alphabet (‘P’, ‘B’, or
‘R’), which fashed on the screen opposite the distractor (‘*’). The target was identifed by
using the up, left, and right arrow keys, which were labeled. The dependent measure for
this task was the error rate for each participant.
Because the anti-saccade task was used to measure prepotent response inhibition, it was
related to both research questions. The research questions were 1) What role or infuence
does inhibitory control have on a user’s cyber security decision-making process? and 2)
Can both attention and inhibitory control account for users making poor cyber security
decisions, or vice versa? This task was also related to H1, which stated that individuals
with strong prepotent response inhibition make better cyber security decisions.
In this task, N = 79 due to the removal of data from four participants. The data points
removed were due to missing data points in task four. Participants’ performance was acceptable on the anti-saccade task, (M = 4.84, SD = 4.61). The dependent measure for this
task was the errors on percentage of trials. The descriptive statistics for this task are found
in Table 6.1, labeled as Measure of Prepotent Response Inhibition.

6.4

Measuring Resistance to Distractor Interference
In this section, the task used to measure resistance to distractor interference is dis-

cussed. Within this discussion, the task will be briefy explained and its association to the
research questions and hypotheses will be stated. Lastly, the results from the task will be
discussed.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Deviation

N

Measure of the SecurityDMP

0.34

0.73

79

Measure of Resistance to PI

5.89

2.77

79

Measure of Resistance to Distractor Interference

0.10

0.13

79

Measure of Prepotent Response Inhibition

4.84

4.61

79

Measure of Perceptual Attention

0.14

0.13

79

The Eriksen Flanker Task was used to measure resistance to distractor interference.
In this task participants had to identify a target alphabet (‘H’, ‘K’, ‘S’, or ‘C’) that appeared in the center position, which was displayed in the center of the screen. The target
appeared on the screen in one of three ways: 1) no distractor (H), 2) distractor similar to
target (HHHKHHH), or 3) distractor incompatible to target (CCCHCCC). The target was
identifed by using the right and left arrow keys, which were labeled.
Since the Eriksen Flanker Task was used to measure resistance to distractor interference, it was related to both research questions. The research questions are stated as such:
1) What role or infuence does inhibitory control have on a user’s cyber security decisionmaking process? and 2) Can both attention and inhibitory control account for users making poor cyber security decisions, or vice versa? This task was only associated with H2,
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which states that individuals with weak resistance to distractor interference make bad cyber
security decisions.
The dependent measure for this task was the reaction times. Specifcally, the reaction
times in the no distractor condition were subtracted from the noise incompatible condition,
for correct trials. This dependent measure was selected based on research in [12] and [17].
The formula for the index was as follows:
index = N oiseIncompatibleRTcorrecttrials − N oN oiseRTcorrecttrials .
For this task, N = 79; the data for four participants had to be removed. Participants’ performance was acceptable on the Eriksen Flanker Task based on the reaction time difference
index, (M = .10, SD = 0.13). The reaction times were measured in seconds. The descriptive statistics can be found in Table 6.1 labeled as Measure of Resistance to Distractor
Interference.

6.5

Measuring Resistance to Proactive Interference (PI)
This section is a discussion of the task used to measure resistance to PI. Additionally,

this section briefy explains the task used to measure participants’ resistance to PI. Also in
this section, the task, research questions, and hypothesis associated with resistance to PI
are discussed. This section closes with results from this task.
The cued recall task was used to measure resistance to proactive interference. This
task required participants to recall or remember a word from a group of words. In this
task there were two type of trials, the one-block trials and the two-block trials. In the oneblock trials participants saw only one list, which was composed of four words each. The
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words appeared in the center of the screen one word at a time (i.e. lake, sun, chips, mint).
After the last word in the list, participants performed a distraction task for fve seconds,
where they had to place a series of three digit numbers (i.e. ‘365’) in descending order.
After completing the distraction task, the cue fashed in the center of the screen and the
participants had to recall the word by typing the word that was associated with the cue. In
this example the cue was herb; so the correct response was mint. The distracting task was
only performed during the one-block trials.The two-block trials were split into two types.
In the frst type of trials the participants saw two lists composed of four words each. An
example looked like such: bike, shoe, dog, and toast in list one and bell, spider, red, and
sheet in list two. The cue that appeared after the last word in the second list, was color,
so the participants had to recall red. The second type of trials in the two-block trials was
where the cue (i.e. body of water) matched a word in both lists (i.e. list one: ball, sun, lake,
and kite and list two: ice, truck, dinner, and ocean). Participants responded by recalling
only the word from the second list (i.e., ocean).
The cued recall task was associated with both research questions because it was used
to measure resistance to PI, which was one of the three branches of inhibitory control. The
research questions were stated as such:1) What role or infuence does inhibitory control
have on a user’s cyber security decision-making process? and 2) Can both attention and
inhibitory control account for users making poor cyber security decisions, or vice versa?
The cued recall task was directly related to H3, which was stated as follows: Resistance
to PI does not affect a user’s cyber security decision-making process, as measured by the
participants’ performance on the cued recall task and the security decision-making task.
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The dependent measure in the cued recall task was a difference index. The index was
obtained by subtracting the summation of correct responses in one-block trials from the
summation of correct responses in the two-block trials. This measure was based on research done in [17] and [58]. The formula for the difference index was as follows:
d.index = 2BlockT rialsT otalCorrect − 1BlockT railsT otalCorrect .
Due to the removal of four participants’ data, N = 79. Participants’ performance was
average on the cued recall task, based on the difference index (M = 5.89, SD = 2.77). The
descriptive statistics are found in Table 6.1, labeled as Measure of Resistance to PI.

6.6

Measuring the Security Decision-making Process
This section covers the discussion of the task used to measure the cyber security decision-

making process. This section highlights the associations between the task used for measuring the security decision-making process and the hypotheses and research questions. This
section ends with the results from the task.
The security decision-making task was used to measure participants’ security decisionmaking processes. In the security decision-making task, participants had to complete six
exercises. These exercises were composed of a series of tasks the participants had to complete using the internet. While completing the tasks, participants had to answer fve or six
questions. Of those six questions, two questions were security related. The other questions were distractor questions relating to the website’s usability, as participants were not
informed that this was an investigation of their security habits. This task was designed to
resemble a usability study, which was the reason for the varying number of questions for
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each exercise. Also, the varying number of questions was a direct result of manipulating
this task to resemble a usability study, because the questions were synchronized with the
tasks that the participants completed in each exercise. Eye tracking data was also collected
while participants executed this task. A quick review/sample exercise from this task went
as follows: the participant had to log in to their email. The participants had to report the
number of unread/new emails in their inbox, along with the total number of emails in their
inbox. The participant had to also list how many people were in their contact list. The distractor questions went as follows: How easy was it to determine the number of unread/new
emails in your inbox? Was it diffcult to determine your number of contacts? and Was it
easy to determine the total number of emails in your inbox? The participants responded by
using a fve point scale. Lastly, the participants had to tell if the internet connection was
secure, and they had to discuss how he/she determined that the connection was secure.
The security decision-making task was associated with both of the research questions,
which state the following: 1) What role or infuence does inhibitory control have on a
user’s cyber security decision-making process? and 2) Can both attention and inhibitory
control account for users making poor cyber security decisions, or vice versa? This task
was also associated with H1, H2, and H3. The hypotheses were stated as follows:
1. (H1) Individuals with strong prepotent response inhibition make better cyber security
decisions, as measured by participants’ performance on the anti-saccade task and
security decision-making task.
2. (H2) Individuals with weak resistance to distractor interference make bad cyber
security decisions, as measured by the performance of the participants on the Eriksen
Flanker task and security decision-making task.
3. (H3) Resistance to PI does not affect users’ cyber security decision-making process,
as measured by participants’ performance on the cued recall task and the security
decision-making task.
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The dependent measure in this task was the security decision index. The index was obtained from participants’ responses to the security questions from each of the six exercises.
For each exercise participants had two scores, one for correctly identifying the connection
as secure or insecure and one for using the proper security indicators for determining if the
connection was secure or insecure. The two scores were combined to obtain the participant
security decision index. In order to get a correct score on an exercise, a participant has to
get a correct score on both the identifcation of the connection and the justifcation/use of
proper security indicator. The maximum score a participant could get was six. Due to the
removal of four participants’ data, N = 79 for this task. Participants generally had bad
security decision-making processes based on the results from this part of the experiment
(M = .34, SD = .73). The descriptive statistics from this task are presented in Table 6.1,
labeled as Measure of the Security DMP.
Due to participants’ poor performance on the security decision-making task, an explanation of participants’ responses is necessary. The responses given for determining if the
connection was secure were as expected. However, the responses given for how they determined whether the connection was secure were the most alarming. The latter of the two
responses was the reasoning or justifcation for the previous response. The average number
of correct responses was nine and the average number of incorrect responses was 70. A
response was considered correct if the participants used the security icons and/or indicators
and incorrect if the participants did not. It was most alarming that participants responded
that their connection was secure because the investigator was responsible for the security.
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Eye tracking data was also collected while participants completed the security decision
making task. The eye tracking data was used as a measure of perceptual attention. The
eye tracking data used was the percentage of time spent looking at the security indicators
versus the time spent looking at the screen. This measure was obtained by dividing the
time (seconds) spent looking at the security indicators, by the total time (seconds) spent
looking at the screen. The time spent looking at security indicators was (M = .14, SD =
.13). The descriptive statistics for the eye tracking data can be found on Table 6.1, labeled
as Measure of Perceptual Attention.

6.7

Measuring the Effect of Inhibitory Control and Perceptual Attention
This section is composed of the results from the linear multiple regression, which was

computed to assess the infuence of inhibitory control and perceptual attention on the cyber
security decision-making process.
The effects of inhibitory control were measured using the following three tasks: the
anti-saccade task (Task1), the Eriksen Flanker task (Task2), and the cued recall task (Task3).
The security decision-making task (Task4) was used to measure the cyber security decisionmaking process. Perceptual attention was measured using the eye tracking data (ET Data)
collected in Task4. The remainder of this section discloses the results, specifcally the results of the correlation matrix, the model summary, and the coeffcients of the correlation.
Table 6.2 depicts the results of the correlation matrix. For this regression, the dependent
variable was Task4. There were four independent variables in this regression, which were
Task1, Task2, Task3, and ET Data. Four participants’ data had to be removed due to
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Table 6.2: Correlation Matrix
Task4

Task2

Task1

Task3

ET Data

Task4: Pearson Correlation

1

0.09

-0.02

-0.03

0.34**

Task2: Pearson Correlation

0.09

1

0.14

0.01

0

Task1: Pearson Correlation

-0.02

0.14

1

0.05

-0.07

Task3: Pearson Correlation

-0.03

0.01

0.05

1

0

0.34**

0

-0.07

0

1

ET Data: Pearson Correlation
**.Correlation is signifcant p <.001
a.Listwise N=79

Table 6.3: Model Summary

Model

1

R

0.357a

R Square

Adjusted R Square

Std. Error of the Estimate

0.128

0.081

0.702

Change Statisics

R Square Change

F Change

df1

df2

Sig. F Change

0.128

2.71

4

74

0.036
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Table 6.4: Coeffcients

Unstandardized Coeffcients

Standardized Coeffecients

Model

B

Std. Error

t

Sig.

Beta

1 (Constant)

0.063

0.227

-0.031

0.276

0.783

Task2

0.536

0.63

0.093

0.85

0.398

Task1

-0.001

0.017

-0.005

-0.041

0.967

Task3

-0.008

0.029

-0.031

-0.287

0.775

1.937

0.614

0.343

3.154

0.002

ET Data
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missing or corrupted data. There was no correlation between Task1 and Task4 [r = -0.02, n
= 79, p > .05]. Again, there was no correlation between Task2 and Task4 [r = 0.09, n = 79,
p > .05]. Also, there was no correlation between Task3 and Task4 [r = -0.03, n = 79, p >
.05]. However, there was a correlation between ET Data value and Task4 [r = 0.34, n= 79,
p < .01]. The effect size was established using the value of the correlation coeffcient (r).
The value of the correlation coeffcient was r = .34, which is a medium-effect size because
r = 0.10 represents a small-effect size, r = 0.30 represents a medium-effect size, and r =
0.50 represents a large-effect size [1].
Table 6.3 is the model summary from the linear multiple regression that was computed.
The model included Task1, anti-saccade task; Task2, Eriksen Flankers Task; Task3, cued
recall task; and ET Data: perceptual attention as predictors and the independent variables.
Task4, the security decision-making task, was included in the model as the dependent
variable. This model explained a signifcant proportion of variance in the security decision
making process, R2 = .128, F (4, 74) = 2.710, p < .05. The effect size was determined by
the Cohen’s f 2 value, where f 2 =
R2
1 − R2 .
The value for Cohen’s f 2 = 0.147 is a small-effect size because values of 0.10 represent
small-effect sizes, values of 0.25 represent medium-effect sizes, and values of 0.40 represent large-effect sizes [8].
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Table 6.4 shows the coeffcients of the regression model. For this model, only perceptual attention, t(74) = 3.15, p <.01), had a signifcant effect on the cyber security decisionmaking process. The effect size was determined using Cohen’s d, where d=
M2 − M1
SDpooled .
The value for Cohen’s d = 0.375. This is a small-effect size because d = 0.2 represents a
small-effect size, d = 0.5 is a medium-effect size, and d = 0.8 represents a large-effect size.
The other three predictors prepotent response inhibition, t(74) = -.041, p >.05), resistance
to distractor inference, t(74) = .850, p >.05), and resistance to PI, t(74) = -.287, p >.05),
all had no signifcant effect on the cyber security decision-making process [8] [19].

6.8 Cyber Security Knowledge
The participants in this experiment on average exhibited mediocre security knowledge,
where 25% of participants scored below average, 55% of participants scored the average,
and 20% of participants scored above average. The participants were asked 11 questions
related to cyber security, and the average total of correct responses was 5.81 (SD = 2.20).
A closer look into participants’ security knowledge revealed that 90% (75) knew what a
frewall was, while 10% (8) did not. Only 33% (27) of participants knew the difference
between http and https and 67% (56) did not. When it came to the padlock icon, 63% (52)
of participants understood what the padlock icon meant and 37% (31) of the participants
did not. Most of the participants 81% (67), understood cookies, and 19% (16) did not.
Only 12% (10) of participants understood digital certifcates, while 88% (73) of participants did not. When it came to spyware, 49% (41) of participants had understanding while
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Table 6.5: Cyber Security Knowledge
Security Knowledge:
Knowledge of:

% Correct

% Incorrect

*Fireware:

90

10

*http: vs. https:

33

67

*Padlock icon:

63

37

Cookies:

81

19

*Digital Certifcate:

12

88

Spyware:

49

51

Viruses:

90

10

*Phishing:

52

48

*Padlock Location:

72

28

*Digital Signature:

28

72

4

96

*Social Engineering:

*vital to defend against Social Engineer/Phishing
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51% (42) of participants did not. The majority of participants 90% (75) had an understanding of viruses. When it came to phishing, only 52% (43) understood phishing, while the
other 48% (40) did not. Seventy-two percent (60) of participants knew where to locate the
padlock icon and the other 28% (23) did not. Twenty-eight percent (23) of participants
understood digital signatures, while the other 72% (60) did not. Lastly, only four percent
or (three) participants understood social engineering, and the other 96% (80) of the participants did not. Table 6.5 shows the results from participants’ responses to the security
questionnaire.

6.9

Conclusion
This chapter covered the results from the four tasks executed by participants in this

experiment. This chapter opened with a discussion of the statistical procedures as well as
data trimming and outlier analyses. Next was a brief discussion of the participants who
participated in this experiment in Section Two. Also in Section Two, participant demographics were discussed, along with participant internet and email usage. Section Three
reviewed the results from the anti-saccade task, which was used to measure participants’
prepotent response inhibition. The Eriksen Flanker Task, which was used to measure resistance to distractor interference, was covered in Section Four. In Section Five, the results
from the cued recall task, which was used to measure resistance to PI, was discussed. Section Six covered the security decision-making task, which was used to measure the security
decision-making process, and Section Seven discussed the results from the linear multiple
regression. Lastly, Section Eight reviewed participants’ cyber security knowledge.
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CHAPTER VII
DISCUSSION

This chapter is a discussion of the results from the statistical analyses conducted on
the data from each task in this experiment. The statistical analyses were conducted to
answer the two research questions and to evaluate the three hypotheses. The research
questions were stated as follows: 1) What role or infuence does inhibitory control have on
a user’s cyber security decision-making process? and 2) Can both attention and inhibitory
control account for users making poor cyber security decisions, or vice versa? The three
hypotheses were stated as follows:
1. (H1) Individuals with strong prepotent response inhibition make better cyber security
decisions, as measured by participants’ performance on the anti-saccade task and
security decision-making task.
2. (H2) Individuals with weak resistance to distractor interference make bad cyber
security decisions, as measured by the performance of the participants on the Eriksen
Flanker task and security decision-making task.
3. (H3) Resistance to PI does not affect users’ cyber security decision-making process,
as measured by participants’ performance on the cued recall task and the security
decision-making task.
The data from all four tasks were analyzed in a linear multiple regression. The antisaccade task (measure for inhibition of prepotent responses), Eriksen Flanker task (measure
for resistance to distractor interference), cued recall task (measure for resistance to PI), and
eye tracking data (measure for perceptual attention) were the independent measures, while
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the security decision-making task (measure of the security decision-making process) was
the dependent measure for the multiple regression.
This chapter is divided into six sections. In Section 7.1 there is a discussion of the
effects of prepotent response inhibition on the security decision-making process. The effects of resistance to distractor interference are discussed in Section 7.2, and Section 7.3
discusses the effects of resistance to PI. Section 7.4 addresses the effects of perceptual
attention on the security decision-making process. Section 7.5 is where experimental limitations are discussed. Section 7.6 concludes this chapter.

7.1

The Effects of Prepotent Response Inhibition
As revealed in Section 6.3, participants’ performance on the anti-saccade task was

acceptable, (M = 4.84, SD = 4.61). This means participants missed on average fve out of
72 trials. If H1 holds, all participants should make good cyber security decisions. H1 does
not hold, and the remainder of this section discusses the rejection of H1.
The frst result to refute H1 was the results on the anti-saccade task and the security
decision-making task. Based on participant performance on the security decision-making
task, it was clear that the sample, N = 79, exhibited bad cyber security decision-making.
This was revealed in Section 6.6 (M = .34, SD = .73). Furthermore, the results in Section 6.7 revealed that there was no correlation between prepotent response inhibition and
the security decision-making process [r = -0.017 n = 79, p > .05]. This further suggests
that prepotent response inhibition does not infuence the cyber security decision-making
process.
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7.2

The Effects of Resistance to Distractor Interference
This section discusses the effects of resistance to distractor interference, which is di-

rectly related to H2. H2 stated that individuals with weak resistance to distractor interference make bad cyber security decisions, as measured by the performance of the participants
on the Eriksen Flanker task and the security decision-making task. The results in Section
6.4 indicated that participants had strong resistance to distractor interference (M = .10, SD
= .13). The difference index was measured in seconds. This means it took participants an
average of 100 milliseconds to suppress distractor interference. If H2 holds, participants’
performance on Task4 should indicate good cyber security decision-making.
In Section 6.6, participant performance on the security decision-making task (Task4)
revealed that the sample, N = 79, processes for making cyber security decisions was poor
(M = .34, SD = .73). These results initially suggested H2 was not supported. Additionally, Section 6.7 revealed there was no correlation between resistance to distractor interference and the security decision-making process [r = 0.093, n = 79, p > .05]. These
combined results established that resistance to distractor interference did not infuence the
cyber security decision-making process.

7.3

The Effects of Resistance to PI
The effect of resistance to PI is discussed in this section, this directly relates to H3. H3

stated: Resistance to PI does not affect users’ cyber security decision-making process, as
measured by participants’ performance on the cued recall task and the security decisionmaking task. Participants exhibited good resistance to PI (M = 5.89, SD = 2.77). This
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means that participants exhibited strong resistance to PI. In order for H3 to hold, participants’ ability for resistance to PI should not infuence their performance on the security
decision-making task.
In Section 6.6, performance on the security decision-making task revealed that the
sample, N = 79, processes for making security decisions was poor (M = .34, SD = .73).
Participant performance on the cued recall and security decision-making task did not give
much insight on the effects of resistance to PI and the security decision-making process.
However, the results in Section 6.7 revealed there was no correlation between resistance to
PI and the security decision-making process [r = -0.031, n = 79, p > .05]. This was support
for H3. Thus, perceptual attention had no effect on resistance to PI.

7.4

The Effects of Perceptual Attention
This section discusses the effect of perceptual attention on the security decision-making

process, which is directly associated with the research questions. The research questions
were stated as follows: 1) What role or infuence does inhibitory control have on a user’s
cyber security decision-making process? and 2) Can both attention and inhibitory control
account for users making poor cyber security decisions, or vice versa? The remainder of
this section discusses the results to answer the two research questions.
In Section 6.7, it was established that there was a positive correlation between perceptual attention and the security decision-making process [r = 0.344, n= 79, p < .01]. Thus,
perceptual attention had a signifcant effect on the cyber security decision-making process. Additional support that established perceptual attention infuenced the cyber security
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decision-making process were the results in Section 6.7. It was revealed that perceptual
attention did not have a correlation with any of the other independent variables: Task1 and
ET Data [r = -0.071, n= 79, p > .05], Task2 and ET Data [r = 0.002, n = 79, p > .05],
Task3 and ET Data [r = -0.003, n = 79, p > .05]. The lack of correlation between the three
branches of inhibitory control and perceptual attention, meant that there was no evidence
for a causal relationship. As it relates to the three hypotheses and research questions, it
was not a cognitive failure or inhibitory control, which caused participants to omit security
indicators/icons in his/her cyber security decision-making process. According to the results in Section 6.7, it was perceptual attention that caused participants to omit the security
indicators/icons during his/her cyber security decision-making process.

7.5

Experimental Limitations
This experiment faced two limitations, which may have infuenced the results of this

experiment. The two limitations were setting/environment and restriction of range. The
setting/environment is the frst design limitation that affected the participants’ security behavior. This experiment was confned to a laboratory setting, which negatively affected
participants’ behavior. This was determined based on participants’ feedback on Task4.
Participants stated that the investigator was responsible for all aspects related to security.
This had a negative infuence on the results, because this indicated that participants did
not feel responsible for her/his own security. Also, this caused participants to assume all
their connections were secure even when they were not secure. This also suggested that
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conducting security experiments in a laboratory setting causes participants to behave in a
less secure manner.
The second limitation to affect the results of this experiment was a restriction in range,
specifcally in the security decision-making task. The results from the security decisionmaking task indicated a lack of variation. Participants’ scores on the security decisionmaking task were not composed of much variation. The scale was from zero to six for
the security decision-making task. A score ranging from zero to three was rated as poor
security decision-making, while a score ranging from four to six was rated as good security
decision-making. The results in Section 6.6 revealed that most participants scored zero (M
= 0.34, SD = .73). This lack of range in scores may have had negative effects on the
analyses that attributed to the weak/lack of correlations between the dependent variable
and the independent variables.
There are three possible explanations for this lack of range. The frst explanation is
related to perceptual attention. Simply put, participants did not attend to the security indicators long enough to exhibit proper alertness and encoding of the security indicators/icons.
This is based on the results in Section 6.6, from the eye tracking data. The eye tracking data
revealed that participants attended to the security indicators/icon for only 140 milliseconds
(M = 0.140, SD = 0.13).
The second explanation for participants displaying such poor cyber security decisionmaking is related to the participants’ security knowledge. The results in Section 6.8 indicated participants had poor cyber security knowledge. In Table 6.5, there are vital elements
useful in the defense of social engineering and phishing. Those observations were as fol114

lows: knowing the difference between http and https, identifying the meaning and location
of the padlock icon, identifying the meaning of digital certifcates, identifying the meaning
of phishing, identifying the meaning of digital signatures, and identifying the meaning of
social engineering. This lack of security knowledge displayed by participants might also
explain why three out of every eight participants asked, “What is a secure connection?”
Based on these results and the responses participants gave on the justifcation questions
when completing the exercises in Task4, the security decision-making task, it was evident
that participants had confused security with trust.
The third explanation for participants displaying poor cyber security decision-making
may have been their associated past experiences. Based on the Theory of Deception, which
was discussed in Section 2.4, past experiences aid in the recognition of discrepancies.
Only 15 participants (18%) revealed that they have been victims of identity theft or have
been notifed of fraudulent activity, while the other 68 participants (82%) had not had any
experience with social engineering or phishing. Not having past experiences with social
engineering or phishing may have caused participants not to be conscious of their cyber
security vulnerabilities.

7.6

Conclusion
This chapter has examined the effects that the three branches of inhibitory control and

perceptual attention have on an individual’s cyber security decision-making process. In
Section 7.1 the effects of prepotent response inhibition were discussed. It was in Section
7.1 that it was determined that prepotent response inhibition did not have a signifcant effect
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on the cyber security decision-making process. Section 7.2 was where it was determined
that resistance to distractor interference did not have a signifcant effect on an individual’s
cyber security decision-making process. It was determined in Section 7.3 that resistance
to PI did not have a signifcant effect on an individual’s cyber security decision-making
process. The results from these three sections only supported H3, and there was no support
for H1 and H2.
In Sections 7.1-7.3, it was determined that inhibitory control did not play a signifcant role and did not signifcantly infuence the cyber security decision-making process.
However, in Section 7.4 it was determined that perceptual attention did play a signifcant
role and signifcantly infuenced the cyber security decision-making process. Lastly, Section 7.5 discussed experimental limitations and highlighted three possible explanations for
participants demonstrating such poor cyber security decision-making process.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSIONS

8.1

Contributions
This experiment examined the cyber security decision-making process, which was dif-

ferent from previous research. Previous research focused more on understanding social
engineering and phishing attacks. Furthermore, this experiment aimed to see if both perceptual attention and inhibitory control infuenced the cyber security decision-making process. Previous research has not specifcally examined the effect of perceptual attention or
inhibitory control. Until now, researchers have only suggested that attention had an effect
on a person’s security behaviors. Previous experiments suffered from design issues, which
did not allow for precise measures of attention. Also, this work was different from previous research because it formally defned perceptual attention as the ability to process a
stimulus when there were multiple stimuli present, achieved by proper alertness and encoding [46]. Chapters six and seven determined that perceptual attention had a signifcant
infuence on the cyber security decision-making process. The results in Section 6.7 and
the discussion in Section 7.4 confrmed the notation that perceptual attention had an effect on security behavior, which previous research had only suggested. There has been an
abundant amount of research on social engineering and phishing, which was highlighted
in Section 2.3, Section 2.4, and Chapter 3, but none of that research investigated to see if
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inhibitory control infuenced the cyber security decision-making process. In Section 1.3,
inhibitory control was discussed. It was highlighted that inhibitory control is divided into
three subcatigories:
1. Prepotent response inhibition is the suppression of automatic responses.
2. Resistance to distractor interference is withstanding interference introduced by information from the external environment that is not relevant to the task at hand.
3. Resistance to PI is suppressing memory interruptions from information that was
relevant to the previous task but now is no longer relevant [17].

It was hypothesized that one and two from above affected the cyber security decisionmaking process and that number three from above did not. The results in Section 6.3-6.5
and the discussion in Section 7.1-7.4 determined that the three categories of inhibitory
control had no signifcant infuence on the cyber security decision-making process.
Lastly, in Section 7.5 experimental limitations, as well as three possible explanations,
were given to explain why participants displayed such poor cyber security decision-making.
The experimental limitations were setting/environment and restriction of range. The frst
explanation related to perceptual attention. It was suggested that participants’ poor security
decision-making was due to participants not attending to the security indicators long enough
for proper alertness and encoding to occur. The second explanation was aligned with previous research and/or experiments, in that participants did not possess suffcient security
knowledge. The fnal explanation also aligned with previous research, which was based
on the Theory of Deception and states that previous experiences aid in recognizing discrepancies. So, because participants did not have suffcient understanding or suffcient
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past experiences with social engineering and phishing the participants were less security
conscious.
The results from this experiment are very benefcial to the Human-Computer Interaction and Security (HCI-Sec) community. First it establishes that perceptual attention has an
effect and inhibitory control does not have an effect on the cyber security decision-making
process, which can be used to develop and design better defensive tools and techniques.
These results have determined that having suffcient security knowledge not only aids in
defending against and/or identifying social engineering and phishing attacks, but security
knowledge is also benefcial in shaping a user’s security habits. Moreover, these results are
in favor of developing a curriculum for defensive cyber security, which will focus on teaching “everyday users” how to be security conscious while in cyberspace and also provide
techniques and strategies for avoiding social engineering and phishing attacks.

8.2

Further Research
The outcome of this experiment has led to several prospective research interests. The

frst research interest is to conduct this experiment again using two groups (cyber security
experts and non-experts) to overcome the restriction of range issue. The next essential research interest is related to experimental design, more specifcally, ways to development
and design cyber security studies that are not confned to laboratory settings. Studies have
shown that cyber security studies conducted in laboratory settings can affect security behavior.
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Another area of research under consideration, deals with the issue of insuffcient security
knowledge and lack of experience with social engineering and phishing. There is a need to
design and development Extension Workshops to promote techniques and tools to safely
and securely train and educate users on defensive strategies and behavior. Borisova and
Useche established two concepts with their study, which explored the effects of Extension
Workshops on household water usage behavior [6]. First, it was established that the workshop was effective. However, it was highlighted that the effects were short lived (about one
month), but to overcome this issue, it was suggested that efforts for reinforcement must be
utilized [6].
The fnal possible research interest relates to social networking, in particular to establish if there is link between social networking behavior and the risk of being a social
engineering or phishing attack victim. The grounds for this research stem from participants’ responses to the security questionnaire, specifcally where participants revealed that
they had experienced identity theft or fraudulent activity. These participants also reported
being very active social networkers.

8.3

Publication Plan
The following publications related to this research have been published:
• E. Pearson, C. L. Bethel, A. F. Jarosz, and M. E. Berman, “‘To click or not to click
is the question’: Fraudulent URL identifcation accuracy in a community sample,”
in 2017 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics (SMC),
2017, pp. 659-664.
• E. Pearson, and C. L. Bethel, “A Design Review: Concepts for Mitigating SQL
Injection Attacks,” 4th International Symposium on Digital Forensics and Security,
IEEE, Little Rock, AK, 25-27 April 2016, pp. 169-173.
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The following publications related to this research are planned:
• “The Effects of Inhibitory Control and Perceptual Attention on Security Behavior”
• “The Inexperienced User: Establishing the Need for Defensive Security Training”
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SURVEYS AND QUESTIONNAIRES
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A.1

Selection Criteria Survey
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A.2

Demographic Survey

130

A.3

Security Questionnaire
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A.4

Exit Survey

Exit Survey
The following five questions are related to your personal experience during this study. Please
read each question carefully and circle the number which represents your response.
1. How much did you like/enjoy participating in this study?
Very little

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Very much

2. How willing would you be to do this again?
Very little

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Very much

3. How bored/interested were you during this study?
Bored 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Interested
4. How inattentive/attentive were you while participating in this study?
Inattentive

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Attentive

5. How dissatisfied/satisfied were you with how the study was conducted?
Dissatisfied

1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 Satisfied
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